[D-m-team] Creating changesets

[Joey Hess]

Anthony Towns wrote:
> Doesn't keycheck need network to make sure its copy of the DD keyring is up
> to date?

It does support using cached data, doesn't need to hit the network every
time.

> Sorry, I meant revocations of the *DM* key. eg, the case where it's been
> stolen, and the thief is using the compromised key to get access to the
> Debian archive, eg.

Ah, definitly worth hitting the network to check that.

> Maybe a better approach would be to strip non-DD sigs, instead? That
> could apply to both the DM keyring and the DD keyring. I'm not sure how
> possible it is.

Not sure if it would save much overall. If a DM has a great many
non-debian sigs, that's probably interesting, too..

-- 
see shy jo
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