[kernel-sec-discuss] r710 - active
Kees Cook
keescook-guest at alioth.debian.org
Tue Feb 27 22:24:37 CET 2007
Author: keescook-guest
Date: 2007-02-27 22:24:37 +0100 (Tue, 27 Feb 2007)
New Revision: 710
Added:
active/CVE-2007-0772.patch
active/CVE-2007-0958.patch
Log:
added upstream patches for CVE-2007-0772, CVE-2007-0958
Added: active/CVE-2007-0772.patch
===================================================================
--- active/CVE-2007-0772.patch 2007-02-27 21:01:17 UTC (rev 709)
+++ active/CVE-2007-0772.patch 2007-02-27 21:24:37 UTC (rev 710)
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+commit e162a033a5882bde0c3bf5a07ee2119f9535cd8c
+Author: Greg Banks <gnb at sgi.com>
+Date: Tue Feb 20 10:12:34 2007 +1100
+
+ [PATCH] Fix a free-wrong-pointer bug in nfs/acl server (CVE-2007-0772)
+
+ Due to type confusion, when an nfsacl verison 2 'ACCESS' request
+ finishes and tries to clean up, it calls fh_put on entiredly the
+ wrong thing and this can cause an oops.
+
+ Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb at suse.de>
+ Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
+ Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh at suse.de>
+
+diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c
+index edde5dc..b617428 100644
+--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c
++++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c
+@@ -287,13 +287,20 @@ static int nfsaclsvc_release_getacl(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+-static int nfsaclsvc_release_fhandle(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
+- struct nfsd_fhandle *resp)
++static int nfsaclsvc_release_attrstat(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
++ struct nfsd_attrstat *resp)
+ {
+ fh_put(&resp->fh);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
++static int nfsaclsvc_release_access(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
++ struct nfsd3_accessres *resp)
++{
++ fh_put(&resp->fh);
++ return 1;
++}
++
+ #define nfsaclsvc_decode_voidargs NULL
+ #define nfsaclsvc_encode_voidres NULL
+ #define nfsaclsvc_release_void NULL
+@@ -322,9 +329,9 @@ struct nfsd3_voidargs { int dummy; };
+ static struct svc_procedure nfsd_acl_procedures2[] = {
+ PROC(null, void, void, void, RC_NOCACHE, ST),
+ PROC(getacl, getacl, getacl, getacl, RC_NOCACHE, ST+1+2*(1+ACL)),
+- PROC(setacl, setacl, attrstat, fhandle, RC_NOCACHE, ST+AT),
+- PROC(getattr, fhandle, attrstat, fhandle, RC_NOCACHE, ST+AT),
+- PROC(access, access, access, fhandle, RC_NOCACHE, ST+AT+1),
++ PROC(setacl, setacl, attrstat, attrstat, RC_NOCACHE, ST+AT),
++ PROC(getattr, fhandle, attrstat, attrstat, RC_NOCACHE, ST+AT),
++ PROC(access, access, access, access, RC_NOCACHE, ST+AT+1),
+ };
+
+ struct svc_version nfsd_acl_version2 = {
Added: active/CVE-2007-0958.patch
===================================================================
--- active/CVE-2007-0958.patch 2007-02-27 21:01:17 UTC (rev 709)
+++ active/CVE-2007-0958.patch 2007-02-27 21:24:37 UTC (rev 710)
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+commit 1fb844961818ce94e782acf6a96b92dc2303553b
+Author: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan at openvz.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 26 00:57:16 2007 -0800
+
+ [PATCH] core-dumping unreadable binaries via PT_INTERP
+
+ Proposed patch to fix #5 in
+ http://www.isec.pl/vulnerabilities/isec-0017-binfmt_elf.txt
+ aka
+ http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2004-1073
+
+ To reproduce, do
+ * grab poc at the end of advisory.
+ * add line "eph.p_memsz = 4096;" after "eph.p_filesz = 4096;"
+ where first "4096" is something equal to or greater than 4096.
+ * ./poc /usr/bin/sudo && ls -l
+
+ Here I get with 2.6.20-rc5:
+
+ -rw------- 1 ad ad 102400 2007-01-15 19:17 core
+ ---s--x--x 2 root root 101820 2007-01-15 19:15 /usr/bin/sudo
+
+ Check for MAY_READ like binfmt_misc.c does.
+
+ Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan at openvz.org>
+ Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm at osdl.org>
+ Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
+
+diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+index 90461f4..669dbe5 100644
+--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
++++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+@@ -682,6 +682,15 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct pt_regs *regs)
+ retval = PTR_ERR(interpreter);
+ if (IS_ERR(interpreter))
+ goto out_free_interp;
++
++ /*
++ * If the binary is not readable then enforce
++ * mm->dumpable = 0 regardless of the interpreter's
++ * permissions.
++ */
++ if (file_permission(interpreter, MAY_READ) < 0)
++ bprm->interp_flags |= BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP;
++
+ retval = kernel_read(interpreter, 0, bprm->buf,
+ BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
+ if (retval != BINPRM_BUF_SIZE) {
+diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c b/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c
+index 6e6d456..a4d933a 100644
+--- a/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c
++++ b/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c
+@@ -234,6 +234,14 @@ static int load_elf_fdpic_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+ goto error;
+ }
+
++ /*
++ * If the binary is not readable then enforce
++ * mm->dumpable = 0 regardless of the interpreter's
++ * permissions.
++ */
++ if (file_permission(interpreter, MAY_READ) < 0)
++ bprm->interp_flags |= BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP;
++
+ retval = kernel_read(interpreter, 0, bprm->buf,
+ BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
+ if (retval < 0)
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