[kernel-sec-discuss] r1440 - active

Michael Gilbert gilbert-guest at alioth.debian.org
Tue Aug 4 05:55:21 UTC 2009


Author: gilbert-guest
Date: 2009-08-04 05:55:20 +0000 (Tue, 04 Aug 2009)
New Revision: 1440

Added:
   active/CVE-2009-XXXX
Log:
new issue


Copied: active/CVE-2009-XXXX (from rev 1439, active/00boilerplate)
===================================================================
--- active/CVE-2009-XXXX	                        (rev 0)
+++ active/CVE-2009-XXXX	2009-08-04 05:55:20 UTC (rev 1440)
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+Candidate:
+Description:
+ do_sigaltstack: avoid copying 'stack_t' as a structure to user space
+.
+ Ulrich Drepper correctly points out that there is generally padding in
+ the structure on 64-bit hosts, and that copying the structure from
+ kernel to user space can leak information from the kernel stack in those
+ padding bytes.
+.
+ Avoid the whole issue by just copying the three members one by one
+ instead, which also means that the function also can avoid the need for
+ a stack frame. This also happens to match how we copy the new structure
+ from user space, so it all even makes sense.
+References:
+ http://git.kernel.org/linus/0083fc2c50e6c5127c2802ad323adf8143ab7856
+ https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=515392
+Ubuntu-Description:
+Notes:
+Bugs:
+upstream:
+linux-2.6:
+2.6.18-etch-security:
+2.6.24-etch-security:
+2.6.26-lenny-security:
+2.6.15-dapper-security:
+2.6.22-gutsy-security:
+2.6.24-hardy-security:
+2.6.27-intrepid-security:


Property changes on: active/CVE-2009-XXXX
___________________________________________________________________
Added: svn:mergeinfo
   + 




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