[kernel] r18059 - in dists/lenny-security/linux-2.6/debian: . patches/bugfix/all patches/series
Dann Frazier
dannf at alioth.debian.org
Wed Sep 7 04:57:34 UTC 2011
Author: dannf
Date: Wed Sep 7 04:57:33 2011
New Revision: 18059
Log:
Switch to MD5 for sequence number generation (CVE-2011-3188)
Added:
dists/lenny-security/linux-2.6/debian/patches/bugfix/all/CVE-2011-3188.patch
Modified:
dists/lenny-security/linux-2.6/debian/changelog
dists/lenny-security/linux-2.6/debian/patches/series/26lenny4
Modified: dists/lenny-security/linux-2.6/debian/changelog
==============================================================================
--- dists/lenny-security/linux-2.6/debian/changelog Wed Sep 7 04:57:26 2011 (r18058)
+++ dists/lenny-security/linux-2.6/debian/changelog Wed Sep 7 04:57:33 2011 (r18059)
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
* restrict access to /proc/pid/* after setuid exec (CVE-2011-1020)
* befs: Validate length of long symbolic links (CVE-2011-2928)
* cifs: fix possible memory corruption in CIFSFindNext (CVE-2011-3191)
+ * Switch to MD5 for sequence number generation (CVE-2011-3188)
[ Moritz Muehlenhoff ]
* ALSA: caiaq - Fix possible string-buffer overflow (CVE-2011-0712)
Added: dists/lenny-security/linux-2.6/debian/patches/bugfix/all/CVE-2011-3188.patch
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ dists/lenny-security/linux-2.6/debian/patches/bugfix/all/CVE-2011-3188.patch Wed Sep 7 04:57:33 2011 (r18059)
@@ -0,0 +1,538 @@
+diff --git a/crypto/md5.c b/crypto/md5.c
+index 39268f3..a528400 100644
+--- a/crypto/md5.c
++++ b/crypto/md5.c
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
+ #include <linux/string.h>
+ #include <linux/crypto.h>
+ #include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
+ #include <asm/byteorder.h>
+
+ #define MD5_DIGEST_SIZE 16
+@@ -27,103 +28,12 @@
+ #define MD5_BLOCK_WORDS 16
+ #define MD5_HASH_WORDS 4
+
+-#define F1(x, y, z) (z ^ (x & (y ^ z)))
+-#define F2(x, y, z) F1(z, x, y)
+-#define F3(x, y, z) (x ^ y ^ z)
+-#define F4(x, y, z) (y ^ (x | ~z))
+-
+-#define MD5STEP(f, w, x, y, z, in, s) \
+- (w += f(x, y, z) + in, w = (w<<s | w>>(32-s)) + x)
+-
+ struct md5_ctx {
+ u32 hash[MD5_HASH_WORDS];
+ u32 block[MD5_BLOCK_WORDS];
+ u64 byte_count;
+ };
+
+-static void md5_transform(u32 *hash, u32 const *in)
+-{
+- u32 a, b, c, d;
+-
+- a = hash[0];
+- b = hash[1];
+- c = hash[2];
+- d = hash[3];
+-
+- MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xd76aa478, 7);
+- MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[1] + 0xe8c7b756, 12);
+- MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x242070db, 17);
+- MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[3] + 0xc1bdceee, 22);
+- MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf57c0faf, 7);
+- MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[5] + 0x4787c62a, 12);
+- MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa8304613, 17);
+- MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[7] + 0xfd469501, 22);
+- MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x698098d8, 7);
+- MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[9] + 0x8b44f7af, 12);
+- MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffff5bb1, 17);
+- MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[11] + 0x895cd7be, 22);
+- MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x6b901122, 7);
+- MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[13] + 0xfd987193, 12);
+- MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xa679438e, 17);
+- MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[15] + 0x49b40821, 22);
+-
+- MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xf61e2562, 5);
+- MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[6] + 0xc040b340, 9);
+- MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x265e5a51, 14);
+- MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[0] + 0xe9b6c7aa, 20);
+- MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xd62f105d, 5);
+- MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[10] + 0x02441453, 9);
+- MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0xd8a1e681, 14);
+- MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[4] + 0xe7d3fbc8, 20);
+- MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0x21e1cde6, 5);
+- MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[14] + 0xc33707d6, 9);
+- MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xf4d50d87, 14);
+- MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[8] + 0x455a14ed, 20);
+- MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0xa9e3e905, 5);
+- MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[2] + 0xfcefa3f8, 9);
+- MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0x676f02d9, 14);
+- MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[12] + 0x8d2a4c8a, 20);
+-
+- MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xfffa3942, 4);
+- MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[8] + 0x8771f681, 11);
+- MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x6d9d6122, 16);
+- MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[14] + 0xfde5380c, 23);
+- MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xa4beea44, 4);
+- MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[4] + 0x4bdecfa9, 11);
+- MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0xf6bb4b60, 16);
+- MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[10] + 0xbebfbc70, 23);
+- MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0x289b7ec6, 4);
+- MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[0] + 0xeaa127fa, 11);
+- MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xd4ef3085, 16);
+- MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[6] + 0x04881d05, 23);
+- MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0xd9d4d039, 4);
+- MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[12] + 0xe6db99e5, 11);
+- MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0x1fa27cf8, 16);
+- MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[2] + 0xc4ac5665, 23);
+-
+- MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xf4292244, 6);
+- MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[7] + 0x432aff97, 10);
+- MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xab9423a7, 15);
+- MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[5] + 0xfc93a039, 21);
+- MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x655b59c3, 6);
+- MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[3] + 0x8f0ccc92, 10);
+- MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffeff47d, 15);
+- MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[1] + 0x85845dd1, 21);
+- MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x6fa87e4f, 6);
+- MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[15] + 0xfe2ce6e0, 10);
+- MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa3014314, 15);
+- MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[13] + 0x4e0811a1, 21);
+- MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf7537e82, 6);
+- MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[11] + 0xbd3af235, 10);
+- MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x2ad7d2bb, 15);
+- MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[9] + 0xeb86d391, 21);
+-
+- hash[0] += a;
+- hash[1] += b;
+- hash[2] += c;
+- hash[3] += d;
+-}
+-
+ /* XXX: this stuff can be optimized */
+ static inline void le32_to_cpu_array(u32 *buf, unsigned int words)
+ {
+diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
+index 1d3de5c..46984b4 100644
+--- a/drivers/char/random.c
++++ b/drivers/char/random.c
+@@ -1295,328 +1295,14 @@ ctl_table random_table[] = {
+ };
+ #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
+
+-/********************************************************************
+- *
+- * Random funtions for networking
+- *
+- ********************************************************************/
+-
+-/*
+- * TCP initial sequence number picking. This uses the random number
+- * generator to pick an initial secret value. This value is hashed
+- * along with the TCP endpoint information to provide a unique
+- * starting point for each pair of TCP endpoints. This defeats
+- * attacks which rely on guessing the initial TCP sequence number.
+- * This algorithm was suggested by Steve Bellovin.
+- *
+- * Using a very strong hash was taking an appreciable amount of the total
+- * TCP connection establishment time, so this is a weaker hash,
+- * compensated for by changing the secret periodically.
+- */
+-
+-/* F, G and H are basic MD4 functions: selection, majority, parity */
+-#define F(x, y, z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z))))
+-#define G(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) + (((x) ^ (y)) & (z)))
+-#define H(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z))
+-
+-/*
+- * The generic round function. The application is so specific that
+- * we don't bother protecting all the arguments with parens, as is generally
+- * good macro practice, in favor of extra legibility.
+- * Rotation is separate from addition to prevent recomputation
+- */
+-#define ROUND(f, a, b, c, d, x, s) \
+- (a += f(b, c, d) + x, a = (a << s) | (a >> (32 - s)))
+-#define K1 0
+-#define K2 013240474631UL
+-#define K3 015666365641UL
+-
+-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+-
+-static __u32 twothirdsMD4Transform(__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[12])
+-{
+- __u32 a = buf[0], b = buf[1], c = buf[2], d = buf[3];
+-
+- /* Round 1 */
+- ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 0] + K1, 3);
+- ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 1] + K1, 7);
+- ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 2] + K1, 11);
+- ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 3] + K1, 19);
+- ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K1, 3);
+- ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 5] + K1, 7);
+- ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 6] + K1, 11);
+- ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K1, 19);
+- ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 8] + K1, 3);
+- ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 9] + K1, 7);
+- ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[10] + K1, 11);
+- ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[11] + K1, 19);
+-
+- /* Round 2 */
+- ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 1] + K2, 3);
+- ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 3] + K2, 5);
+- ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 5] + K2, 9);
+- ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K2, 13);
+- ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K2, 3);
+- ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[11] + K2, 5);
+- ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 0] + K2, 9);
+- ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K2, 13);
+- ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K2, 3);
+- ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 6] + K2, 5);
+- ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 8] + K2, 9);
+- ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[10] + K2, 13);
+-
+- /* Round 3 */
+- ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 3] + K3, 3);
+- ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 7] + K3, 9);
+- ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[11] + K3, 11);
+- ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K3, 15);
+- ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 6] + K3, 3);
+- ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[10] + K3, 9);
+- ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 1] + K3, 11);
+- ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 5] + K3, 15);
+- ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K3, 3);
+- ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 0] + K3, 9);
+- ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 4] + K3, 11);
+- ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 8] + K3, 15);
+-
+- return buf[1] + b; /* "most hashed" word */
+- /* Alternative: return sum of all words? */
+-}
+-#endif
+-
+-#undef ROUND
+-#undef F
+-#undef G
+-#undef H
+-#undef K1
+-#undef K2
+-#undef K3
+-
+-/* This should not be decreased so low that ISNs wrap too fast. */
+-#define REKEY_INTERVAL (300 * HZ)
+-/*
+- * Bit layout of the tcp sequence numbers (before adding current time):
+- * bit 24-31: increased after every key exchange
+- * bit 0-23: hash(source,dest)
+- *
+- * The implementation is similar to the algorithm described
+- * in the Appendix of RFC 1185, except that
+- * - it uses a 1 MHz clock instead of a 250 kHz clock
+- * - it performs a rekey every 5 minutes, which is equivalent
+- * to a (source,dest) tulple dependent forward jump of the
+- * clock by 0..2^(HASH_BITS+1)
+- *
+- * Thus the average ISN wraparound time is 68 minutes instead of
+- * 4.55 hours.
+- *
+- * SMP cleanup and lock avoidance with poor man's RCU.
+- * Manfred Spraul <manfred at colorfullife.com>
+- *
+- */
+-#define COUNT_BITS 8
+-#define COUNT_MASK ((1 << COUNT_BITS) - 1)
+-#define HASH_BITS 24
+-#define HASH_MASK ((1 << HASH_BITS) - 1)
+-
+-static struct keydata {
+- __u32 count; /* already shifted to the final position */
+- __u32 secret[12];
+-} ____cacheline_aligned ip_keydata[2];
+-
+-static unsigned int ip_cnt;
+-
+-static void rekey_seq_generator(struct work_struct *work);
+-
+-static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(rekey_work, rekey_seq_generator);
+-
+-/*
+- * Lock avoidance:
+- * The ISN generation runs lockless - it's just a hash over random data.
+- * State changes happen every 5 minutes when the random key is replaced.
+- * Synchronization is performed by having two copies of the hash function
+- * state and rekey_seq_generator always updates the inactive copy.
+- * The copy is then activated by updating ip_cnt.
+- * The implementation breaks down if someone blocks the thread
+- * that processes SYN requests for more than 5 minutes. Should never
+- * happen, and even if that happens only a not perfectly compliant
+- * ISN is generated, nothing fatal.
+- */
+-static void rekey_seq_generator(struct work_struct *work)
+-{
+- struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[1 ^ (ip_cnt & 1)];
+-
+- get_random_bytes(keyptr->secret, sizeof(keyptr->secret));
+- keyptr->count = (ip_cnt & COUNT_MASK) << HASH_BITS;
+- smp_wmb();
+- ip_cnt++;
+- schedule_delayed_work(&rekey_work, REKEY_INTERVAL);
+-}
+-
+-static inline struct keydata *get_keyptr(void)
+-{
+- struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[ip_cnt & 1];
+-
+- smp_rmb();
+-
+- return keyptr;
+-}
++static u32 random_int_secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4] ____cacheline_aligned;
+
+-static __init int seqgen_init(void)
++static int __init random_int_secret_init(void)
+ {
+- rekey_seq_generator(NULL);
++ get_random_bytes(random_int_secret, sizeof(random_int_secret));
+ return 0;
+ }
+-late_initcall(seqgen_init);
+-
+-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+-__u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
+- __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
+-{
+- __u32 seq;
+- __u32 hash[12];
+- struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
+-
+- /* The procedure is the same as for IPv4, but addresses are longer.
+- * Thus we must use twothirdsMD4Transform.
+- */
+-
+- memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
+- hash[4] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
+- memcpy(&hash[5], keyptr->secret, sizeof(__u32) * 7);
+-
+- seq = twothirdsMD4Transform((const __u32 *)daddr, hash) & HASH_MASK;
+- seq += keyptr->count;
+-
+- seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
+-
+- return seq;
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_sequence_number);
+-#endif
+-
+-/* The code below is shamelessly stolen from secure_tcp_sequence_number().
+- * All blames to Andrey V. Savochkin <saw at msu.ru>.
+- */
+-__u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr)
+-{
+- struct keydata *keyptr;
+- __u32 hash[4];
+-
+- keyptr = get_keyptr();
+-
+- /*
+- * Pick a unique starting offset for each IP destination.
+- * The dest ip address is placed in the starting vector,
+- * which is then hashed with random data.
+- */
+- hash[0] = (__force __u32)daddr;
+- hash[1] = keyptr->secret[9];
+- hash[2] = keyptr->secret[10];
+- hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
+-
+- return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
+-}
+-
+-#ifdef CONFIG_INET
+-
+-__u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+- __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
+-{
+- __u32 seq;
+- __u32 hash[4];
+- struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
+-
+- /*
+- * Pick a unique starting offset for each TCP connection endpoints
+- * (saddr, daddr, sport, dport).
+- * Note that the words are placed into the starting vector, which is
+- * then mixed with a partial MD4 over random data.
+- */
+- hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
+- hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
+- hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
+- hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
+-
+- seq = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret) & HASH_MASK;
+- seq += keyptr->count;
+- /*
+- * As close as possible to RFC 793, which
+- * suggests using a 250 kHz clock.
+- * Further reading shows this assumes 2 Mb/s networks.
+- * For 10 Mb/s Ethernet, a 1 MHz clock is appropriate.
+- * For 10 Gb/s Ethernet, a 1 GHz clock should be ok, but
+- * we also need to limit the resolution so that the u32 seq
+- * overlaps less than one time per MSL (2 minutes).
+- * Choosing a clock of 64 ns period is OK. (period of 274 s)
+- */
+- seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real()) >> 6;
+-
+- return seq;
+-}
+-
+-/* Generate secure starting point for ephemeral IPV4 transport port search */
+-u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport)
+-{
+- struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
+- u32 hash[4];
+-
+- /*
+- * Pick a unique starting offset for each ephemeral port search
+- * (saddr, daddr, dport) and 48bits of random data.
+- */
+- hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
+- hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
+- hash[2] = (__force u32)dport ^ keyptr->secret[10];
+- hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
+-
+- return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
+-}
+-
+-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+-u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
+- __be16 dport)
+-{
+- struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
+- u32 hash[12];
+-
+- memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
+- hash[4] = (__force u32)dport;
+- memcpy(&hash[5], keyptr->secret, sizeof(__u32) * 7);
+-
+- return twothirdsMD4Transform((const __u32 *)daddr, hash);
+-}
+-#endif
+-
+-#if defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP) || defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP_MODULE)
+-/* Similar to secure_tcp_sequence_number but generate a 48 bit value
+- * bit's 32-47 increase every key exchange
+- * 0-31 hash(source, dest)
+- */
+-u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+- __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
+-{
+- u64 seq;
+- __u32 hash[4];
+- struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
+-
+- hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
+- hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
+- hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
+- hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
+-
+- seq = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
+- seq |= ((u64)keyptr->count) << (32 - HASH_BITS);
+-
+- seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
+- seq &= (1ull << 48) - 1;
+-
+- return seq;
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccp_sequence_number);
+-#endif
+-
+-#endif /* CONFIG_INET */
+-
++late_initcall(random_int_secret_init);
+
+ /*
+ * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. Similar to urandom but
+@@ -1624,17 +1310,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccp_sequence_number);
+ * value is not cryptographically secure but for several uses the cost of
+ * depleting entropy is too high
+ */
+-DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [4], get_random_int_hash);
++DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [MD5_DIGEST_WORDS], get_random_int_hash);
+ unsigned int get_random_int(void)
+ {
+- struct keydata *keyptr;
+ __u32 *hash = get_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);
+- int ret;
++ unsigned int ret;
+
+- keyptr = get_keyptr();
+ hash[0] += current->pid + jiffies + get_cycles() + (int)(long)&ret;
+-
+- ret = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
++ md5_transform(hash, random_int_secret);
++ ret = hash[0];
+ put_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);
+
+ return ret;
+diff --git a/include/linux/cryptohash.h b/include/linux/cryptohash.h
+index c118b2a..1ba279b 100644
+--- a/include/linux/cryptohash.h
++++ b/include/linux/cryptohash.h
+@@ -7,6 +7,11 @@
+ void sha_init(__u32 *buf);
+ void sha_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *W);
+
++#define MD5_DIGEST_WORDS 4
++#define MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES 64
++
++void md5_transform(__u32 *hash, __u32 const *in);
++
+ __u32 half_md4_transform(__u32 buf[4], __u32 const in[8]);
+
+ #endif
+diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
+index 36f125c..2d74fe2 100644
+--- a/include/linux/random.h
++++ b/include/linux/random.h
+@@ -51,17 +51,6 @@ extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
+ extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
+ void generate_random_uuid(unsigned char uuid_out[16]);
+
+-extern __u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr);
+-extern u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
+-extern u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
+- __be16 dport);
+-extern __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+- __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
+-extern __u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
+- __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
+-extern u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+- __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
+-
+ #ifndef MODULE
+ extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
+ #endif
+diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
+index 74b0cfb..44721c7 100644
+--- a/lib/Makefile
++++ b/lib/Makefile
+@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
+ lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \
+ rbtree.o radix-tree.o dump_stack.o \
+ idr.o int_sqrt.o extable.o prio_tree.o \
+- sha1.o irq_regs.o reciprocal_div.o argv_split.o \
++ sha1.o md5.o irq_regs.o reciprocal_div.o argv_split.o \
+ proportions.o prio_heap.o ratelimit.o
+
+ lib-$(CONFIG_MMU) += ioremap.o
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c
+index 96be336..8330b55 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/route.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/route.c
+@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+ #include <linux/sysctl.h>
+ #endif
++#include <net/secure_seq.h>
+
+ #define RT_FL_TOS(oldflp) \
+ ((u32)(oldflp->fl4_tos & (IPTOS_RT_MASK | RTO_ONLINK)))
Modified: dists/lenny-security/linux-2.6/debian/patches/series/26lenny4
==============================================================================
--- dists/lenny-security/linux-2.6/debian/patches/series/26lenny4 Wed Sep 7 04:57:26 2011 (r18058)
+++ dists/lenny-security/linux-2.6/debian/patches/series/26lenny4 Wed Sep 7 04:57:33 2011 (r18059)
@@ -20,3 +20,4 @@
+ bugfix/all/befs-ensure-fast-symlinks-are-NUL-terminated.patch
+ bugfix/all/befs-validate-length-of-long-symbolic-links.patch
+ bugfix/all/cifs-fix-possible-memory-corruption-in-CIFSFindNext.patch
++ bugfix/all/CVE-2011-3188.patch
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