[kernel] r22116 - in dists/wheezy-security/linux/debian: . patches patches/bugfix/x86
Ben Hutchings
benh at moszumanska.debian.org
Sun Dec 7 03:00:33 UTC 2014
Author: benh
Date: Sun Dec 7 03:00:32 2014
New Revision: 22116
Log:
Add fixes for CVE-2014-9090 and related issues
Added:
dists/wheezy-security/linux/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/x86_64-traps-Fix-the-espfix64-DF-fixup-and-rewrite-i.patch
dists/wheezy-security/linux/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/x86_64-traps-Rework-bad_iret.patch
dists/wheezy-security/linux/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/x86_64-traps-Stop-using-IST-for-SS.patch
Modified:
dists/wheezy-security/linux/debian/changelog
dists/wheezy-security/linux/debian/patches/series
Modified: dists/wheezy-security/linux/debian/changelog
==============================================================================
--- dists/wheezy-security/linux/debian/changelog Sun Dec 7 00:19:34 2014 (r22115)
+++ dists/wheezy-security/linux/debian/changelog Sun Dec 7 03:00:32 2014 (r22116)
@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@
* kvm: fix excessive pages un-pinning in kvm_iommu_map error path.
(CVE-2014-8369)
* media: ttusb-dec: buffer overflow in ioctl (CVE-2014-8884)
+ * [amd64] traps: Stop using IST for #SS (CVE-2014-9090)
+ * [amd64] traps: Fix the espfix64 #DF fixup and rewrite it in C
+ * [amd64] traps: Rework bad_iret
-- Ben Hutchings <ben at decadent.org.uk> Sat, 06 Dec 2014 23:32:07 +0000
Added: dists/wheezy-security/linux/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/x86_64-traps-Fix-the-espfix64-DF-fixup-and-rewrite-i.patch
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ dists/wheezy-security/linux/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/x86_64-traps-Fix-the-espfix64-DF-fixup-and-rewrite-i.patch Sun Dec 7 03:00:32 2014 (r22116)
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+From: Andy Lutomirski <luto at amacapital.net>
+Date: Sat, 22 Nov 2014 18:00:31 -0800
+Subject: x86_64, traps: Fix the espfix64 #DF fixup and rewrite it in C
+Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/af726f21ed8af2cdaa4e93098dc211521218ae65
+
+There's nothing special enough about the espfix64 double fault fixup to
+justify writing it in assembly. Move it to C.
+
+This also fixes a bug: if the double fault came from an IST stack, the
+old asm code would return to a partially uninitialized stack frame.
+
+Fixes: 3891a04aafd668686239349ea58f3314ea2af86b
+Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto at amacapital.net>
+Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx at linutronix.de>
+Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
+[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
+ - Keep using the paranoiderrorentry macro to generate the asm code
+ - Adjust context]
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S | 34 ++--------------------------------
+ arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S
+@@ -873,6 +873,7 @@ ENTRY(native_iret)
+ jnz native_irq_return_ldt
+ #endif
+
++.global native_irq_return_iret
+ native_irq_return_iret:
+ iretq
+
+@@ -972,37 +973,6 @@ ENTRY(retint_kernel)
+ CFI_ENDPROC
+ END(common_interrupt)
+
+- /*
+- * If IRET takes a fault on the espfix stack, then we
+- * end up promoting it to a doublefault. In that case,
+- * modify the stack to make it look like we just entered
+- * the #GP handler from user space, similar to bad_iret.
+- */
+-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64
+- ALIGN
+-__do_double_fault:
+- XCPT_FRAME 1 RDI+8
+- movq RSP(%rdi),%rax /* Trap on the espfix stack? */
+- sarq $PGDIR_SHIFT,%rax
+- cmpl $ESPFIX_PGD_ENTRY,%eax
+- jne do_double_fault /* No, just deliver the fault */
+- cmpl $__KERNEL_CS,CS(%rdi)
+- jne do_double_fault
+- movq RIP(%rdi),%rax
+- cmpq $native_irq_return_iret,%rax
+- jne do_double_fault /* This shouldn't happen... */
+- movq PER_CPU_VAR(kernel_stack),%rax
+- subq $(6*8-KERNEL_STACK_OFFSET),%rax /* Reset to original stack */
+- movq %rax,RSP(%rdi)
+- movq $0,(%rax) /* Missing (lost) #GP error code */
+- movq $general_protection,RIP(%rdi)
+- retq
+- CFI_ENDPROC
+-END(__do_double_fault)
+-#else
+-# define __do_double_fault do_double_fault
+-#endif
+-
+ /*
+ * End of kprobes section
+ */
+@@ -1169,7 +1139,7 @@ zeroentry overflow do_overflow
+ zeroentry bounds do_bounds
+ zeroentry invalid_op do_invalid_op
+ zeroentry device_not_available do_device_not_available
+-paranoiderrorentry double_fault __do_double_fault
++paranoiderrorentry double_fault do_double_fault
+ zeroentry coprocessor_segment_overrun do_coprocessor_segment_overrun
+ errorentry invalid_TSS do_invalid_TSS
+ errorentry segment_not_present do_segment_not_present
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+@@ -224,6 +224,30 @@ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struc
+ static const char str[] = "double fault";
+ struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64
++ extern unsigned char native_irq_return_iret[];
++
++ /*
++ * If IRET takes a non-IST fault on the espfix64 stack, then we
++ * end up promoting it to a doublefault. In that case, modify
++ * the stack to make it look like we just entered the #GP
++ * handler from user space, similar to bad_iret.
++ */
++ if (((long)regs->sp >> PGDIR_SHIFT) == ESPFIX_PGD_ENTRY &&
++ regs->cs == __KERNEL_CS &&
++ regs->ip == (unsigned long)native_irq_return_iret)
++ {
++ struct pt_regs *normal_regs = task_pt_regs(current);
++
++ /* Fake a #GP(0) from userspace. */
++ memmove(&normal_regs->ip, (void *)regs->sp, 5*8);
++ normal_regs->orig_ax = 0; /* Missing (lost) #GP error code */
++ regs->ip = (unsigned long)general_protection;
++ regs->sp = (unsigned long)&normal_regs->orig_ax;
++ return;
++ }
++#endif
++
+ /* Return not checked because double check cannot be ignored */
+ notify_die(DIE_TRAP, str, regs, error_code, X86_TRAP_DF, SIGSEGV);
+
Added: dists/wheezy-security/linux/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/x86_64-traps-Rework-bad_iret.patch
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ dists/wheezy-security/linux/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/x86_64-traps-Rework-bad_iret.patch Sun Dec 7 03:00:32 2014 (r22116)
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+From: Andy Lutomirski <luto at amacapital.net>
+Date: Sat, 22 Nov 2014 18:00:33 -0800
+Subject: x86_64, traps: Rework bad_iret
+Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/b645af2d5905c4e32399005b867987919cbfc3ae
+
+It's possible for iretq to userspace to fail. This can happen because
+of a bad CS, SS, or RIP.
+
+Historically, we've handled it by fixing up an exception from iretq to
+land at bad_iret, which pretends that the failed iret frame was really
+the hardware part of #GP(0) from userspace. To make this work, there's
+an extra fixup to fudge the gs base into a usable state.
+
+This is suboptimal because it loses the original exception. It's also
+buggy because there's no guarantee that we were on the kernel stack to
+begin with. For example, if the failing iret happened on return from an
+NMI, then we'll end up executing general_protection on the NMI stack.
+This is bad for several reasons, the most immediate of which is that
+general_protection, as a non-paranoid idtentry, will try to deliver
+signals and/or schedule from the wrong stack.
+
+This patch throws out bad_iret entirely. As a replacement, it augments
+the existing swapgs fudge into a full-blown iret fixup, mostly written
+in C. It's should be clearer and more correct.
+
+Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto at amacapital.net>
+Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx at linutronix.de>
+Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
+[bwh: Backported to 3.2: we didn't use the _ASM_EXTABLE macro]
+---
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S
+@@ -875,12 +875,14 @@ ENTRY(native_iret)
+
+ .global native_irq_return_iret
+ native_irq_return_iret:
++ /*
++ * This may fault. Non-paranoid faults on return to userspace are
++ * handled by fixup_bad_iret. These include #SS, #GP, and #NP.
++ * Double-faults due to espfix64 are handled in do_double_fault.
++ * Other faults here are fatal.
++ */
+ iretq
+
+- .section __ex_table,"a"
+- .quad native_irq_return_iret, bad_iret
+- .previous
+-
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64
+ native_irq_return_ldt:
+ pushq_cfi %rax
+@@ -907,25 +909,6 @@ native_irq_return_ldt:
+ jmp native_irq_return_iret
+ #endif
+
+- .section .fixup,"ax"
+-bad_iret:
+- /*
+- * The iret traps when the %cs or %ss being restored is bogus.
+- * We've lost the original trap vector and error code.
+- * #GPF is the most likely one to get for an invalid selector.
+- * So pretend we completed the iret and took the #GPF in user mode.
+- *
+- * We are now running with the kernel GS after exception recovery.
+- * But error_entry expects us to have user GS to match the user %cs,
+- * so swap back.
+- */
+- pushq $0
+-
+- SWAPGS
+- jmp general_protection
+-
+- .previous
+-
+ /* edi: workmask, edx: work */
+ retint_careful:
+ CFI_RESTORE_STATE
+@@ -1463,16 +1446,15 @@ error_sti:
+
+ /*
+ * There are two places in the kernel that can potentially fault with
+- * usergs. Handle them here. The exception handlers after iret run with
+- * kernel gs again, so don't set the user space flag. B stepping K8s
+- * sometimes report an truncated RIP for IRET exceptions returning to
+- * compat mode. Check for these here too.
++ * usergs. Handle them here. B stepping K8s sometimes report a
++ * truncated RIP for IRET exceptions returning to compat mode. Check
++ * for these here too.
+ */
+ error_kernelspace:
+ incl %ebx
+ leaq native_irq_return_iret(%rip),%rcx
+ cmpq %rcx,RIP+8(%rsp)
+- je error_swapgs
++ je error_bad_iret
+ movl %ecx,%eax /* zero extend */
+ cmpq %rax,RIP+8(%rsp)
+ je bstep_iret
+@@ -1483,7 +1465,15 @@ error_kernelspace:
+ bstep_iret:
+ /* Fix truncated RIP */
+ movq %rcx,RIP+8(%rsp)
+- jmp error_swapgs
++ /* fall through */
++
++error_bad_iret:
++ SWAPGS
++ mov %rsp,%rdi
++ call fixup_bad_iret
++ mov %rax,%rsp
++ decl %ebx /* Return to usergs */
++ jmp error_sti
+ CFI_ENDPROC
+ END(error_entry)
+
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+@@ -363,6 +363,35 @@ asmlinkage __kprobes struct pt_regs *syn
+ *regs = *eregs;
+ return regs;
+ }
++
++struct bad_iret_stack {
++ void *error_entry_ret;
++ struct pt_regs regs;
++};
++
++asmlinkage __visible
++struct bad_iret_stack *fixup_bad_iret(struct bad_iret_stack *s)
++{
++ /*
++ * This is called from entry_64.S early in handling a fault
++ * caused by a bad iret to user mode. To handle the fault
++ * correctly, we want move our stack frame to task_pt_regs
++ * and we want to pretend that the exception came from the
++ * iret target.
++ */
++ struct bad_iret_stack *new_stack =
++ container_of(task_pt_regs(current),
++ struct bad_iret_stack, regs);
++
++ /* Copy the IRET target to the new stack. */
++ memmove(&new_stack->regs.ip, (void *)s->regs.sp, 5*8);
++
++ /* Copy the remainder of the stack from the current stack. */
++ memmove(new_stack, s, offsetof(struct bad_iret_stack, regs.ip));
++
++ BUG_ON(!user_mode_vm(&new_stack->regs));
++ return new_stack;
++}
+ #endif
+
+ /*
Added: dists/wheezy-security/linux/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/x86_64-traps-Stop-using-IST-for-SS.patch
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ dists/wheezy-security/linux/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/x86_64-traps-Stop-using-IST-for-SS.patch Sun Dec 7 03:00:32 2014 (r22116)
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+From: Andy Lutomirski <luto at amacapital.net>
+Date: Sat, 22 Nov 2014 18:00:32 -0800
+Subject: x86_64, traps: Stop using IST for #SS
+Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/6f442be2fb22be02cafa606f1769fa1e6f894441
+
+On a 32-bit kernel, this has no effect, since there are no IST stacks.
+
+On a 64-bit kernel, #SS can only happen in user code, on a failed iret
+to user space, a canonical violation on access via RSP or RBP, or a
+genuine stack segment violation in 32-bit kernel code. The first two
+cases don't need IST, and the latter two cases are unlikely fatal bugs,
+and promoting them to double faults would be fine.
+
+This fixes a bug in which the espfix64 code mishandles a stack segment
+violation.
+
+This saves 4k of memory per CPU and a tiny bit of code.
+
+Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto at amacapital.net>
+Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx at linutronix.de>
+Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
+[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
+ - No need to define trace_stack_segment
+ - Use the errorentry macro to generate #SS asm code
+ - Adjust context
+ - Checked that this matches Luis's backport for Ubuntu]
+---
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_32_types.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_32_types.h
+@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@
+ #define THREAD_ORDER 1
+ #define THREAD_SIZE (PAGE_SIZE << THREAD_ORDER)
+
+-#define STACKFAULT_STACK 0
+ #define DOUBLEFAULT_STACK 1
+ #define NMI_STACK 0
+ #define DEBUG_STACK 0
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h
+@@ -14,12 +14,11 @@
+ #define IRQ_STACK_ORDER 2
+ #define IRQ_STACK_SIZE (PAGE_SIZE << IRQ_STACK_ORDER)
+
+-#define STACKFAULT_STACK 1
+-#define DOUBLEFAULT_STACK 2
+-#define NMI_STACK 3
+-#define DEBUG_STACK 4
+-#define MCE_STACK 5
+-#define N_EXCEPTION_STACKS 5 /* hw limit: 7 */
++#define DOUBLEFAULT_STACK 1
++#define NMI_STACK 2
++#define DEBUG_STACK 3
++#define MCE_STACK 4
++#define N_EXCEPTION_STACKS 4 /* hw limit: 7 */
+
+ #define PUD_PAGE_SIZE (_AC(1, UL) << PUD_SHIFT)
+ #define PUD_PAGE_MASK (~(PUD_PAGE_SIZE-1))
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
+@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ static char x86_stack_ids[][8] = {
+ [ DEBUG_STACK-1 ] = "#DB",
+ [ NMI_STACK-1 ] = "NMI",
+ [ DOUBLEFAULT_STACK-1 ] = "#DF",
+- [ STACKFAULT_STACK-1 ] = "#SS",
+ [ MCE_STACK-1 ] = "#MC",
+ #if DEBUG_STKSZ > EXCEPTION_STKSZ
+ [ N_EXCEPTION_STACKS ...
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S
+@@ -1383,7 +1383,7 @@ apicinterrupt XEN_HVM_EVTCHN_CALLBACK \
+
+ paranoidzeroentry_ist debug do_debug DEBUG_STACK
+ paranoidzeroentry_ist int3 do_int3 DEBUG_STACK
+-paranoiderrorentry stack_segment do_stack_segment
++errorentry stack_segment do_stack_segment
+ #ifdef CONFIG_XEN
+ zeroentry xen_debug do_debug
+ zeroentry xen_int3 do_int3
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+@@ -213,24 +213,12 @@ DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_OLD_MF, SIGFPE, "copro
+ coprocessor_segment_overrun)
+ DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_TS, SIGSEGV, "invalid TSS", invalid_TSS)
+ DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_NP, SIGBUS, "segment not present", segment_not_present)
+-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_SS, SIGBUS, "stack segment", stack_segment)
+-#endif
+ DO_ERROR_INFO(X86_TRAP_AC, SIGBUS, "alignment check", alignment_check,
+ BUS_ADRALN, 0)
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ /* Runs on IST stack */
+-dotraplinkage void do_stack_segment(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
+-{
+- if (notify_die(DIE_TRAP, "stack segment", regs, error_code,
+- X86_TRAP_SS, SIGBUS) == NOTIFY_STOP)
+- return;
+- preempt_conditional_sti(regs);
+- do_trap(X86_TRAP_SS, SIGBUS, "stack segment", regs, error_code, NULL);
+- preempt_conditional_cli(regs);
+-}
+-
+ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
+ {
+ static const char str[] = "double fault";
+@@ -711,7 +699,7 @@ void __init trap_init(void)
+ set_intr_gate(X86_TRAP_OLD_MF, &coprocessor_segment_overrun);
+ set_intr_gate(X86_TRAP_TS, &invalid_TSS);
+ set_intr_gate(X86_TRAP_NP, &segment_not_present);
+- set_intr_gate_ist(X86_TRAP_SS, &stack_segment, STACKFAULT_STACK);
++ set_intr_gate(X86_TRAP_SS, stack_segment);
+ set_intr_gate(X86_TRAP_GP, &general_protection);
+ set_intr_gate(X86_TRAP_SPURIOUS, &spurious_interrupt_bug);
+ set_intr_gate(X86_TRAP_MF, &coprocessor_error);
Modified: dists/wheezy-security/linux/debian/patches/series
==============================================================================
--- dists/wheezy-security/linux/debian/patches/series Sun Dec 7 00:19:34 2014 (r22115)
+++ dists/wheezy-security/linux/debian/patches/series Sun Dec 7 03:00:32 2014 (r22116)
@@ -1159,3 +1159,6 @@
bugfix/all/net-sctp-fix-NULL-pointer-dereference-in-af-from_add.patch
bugfix/all/kvm-fix-excessive-pages-un-pinning-in-kvm_iommu_map-.patch
bugfix/all/media-ttusb-dec-buffer-overflow-in-ioctl.patch
+bugfix/x86/x86_64-traps-Stop-using-IST-for-SS.patch
+bugfix/x86/x86_64-traps-Fix-the-espfix64-DF-fixup-and-rewrite-i.patch
+bugfix/x86/x86_64-traps-Rework-bad_iret.patch
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