[kernel] r21898 - in dists/wheezy/linux/debian: . patches patches/bugfix/all
Ben Hutchings
benh at moszumanska.debian.org
Wed Sep 24 02:35:13 UTC 2014
Author: benh
Date: Wed Sep 24 02:35:12 2014
New Revision: 21898
Log:
Add fixes for udf and ceph security issues
Added:
dists/wheezy/linux/debian/patches/bugfix/all/libceph-add-process_one_ticket-helper.patch
dists/wheezy/linux/debian/patches/bugfix/all/libceph-do-not-hard-code-max-auth-ticket-len.patch
dists/wheezy/linux/debian/patches/bugfix/all/udf-Avoid-infinite-loop-when-processing-indirect-ICB.patch
Modified:
dists/wheezy/linux/debian/changelog
dists/wheezy/linux/debian/patches/series
Modified: dists/wheezy/linux/debian/changelog
==============================================================================
--- dists/wheezy/linux/debian/changelog Wed Sep 24 01:17:44 2014 (r21897)
+++ dists/wheezy/linux/debian/changelog Wed Sep 24 02:35:12 2014 (r21898)
@@ -192,6 +192,9 @@
* nfsd: Fix ACL null pointer deref (thanks to Sergio Gelato)
(Closes: #754420)
* ext4: fix BUG_ON in mb_free_blocks() (regression in 3.2.63)
+ * udf: Avoid infinite loop when processing indirect ICBs (CVE-2014-6410)
+ * libceph: do not hard code max auth ticket len (CVE-2014-6416,
+ CVE-2014-6417, CVE-2014-6418)
[ Cyril Brulebois ]
* udeb: Add virtio_scsi to virtio-modules (Closes: #756249).
Added: dists/wheezy/linux/debian/patches/bugfix/all/libceph-add-process_one_ticket-helper.patch
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ dists/wheezy/linux/debian/patches/bugfix/all/libceph-add-process_one_ticket-helper.patch Wed Sep 24 02:35:12 2014 (r21898)
@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+From: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov at inktank.com>
+Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2014 17:25:34 +0400
+Subject: libceph: add process_one_ticket() helper
+Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/597cda357716a3cf8d994cb11927af917c8d71fa
+
+Add a helper for processing individual cephx auth tickets. Needed for
+the next commit, which deals with allocating ticket buffers. (Most of
+the diff here is whitespace - view with git diff -b).
+
+Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov at inktank.com>
+Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage at redhat.com>
+---
+ net/ceph/auth_x.c | 228 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 124 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/ceph/auth_x.c b/net/ceph/auth_x.c
+index 96238ba..0eb146d 100644
+--- a/net/ceph/auth_x.c
++++ b/net/ceph/auth_x.c
+@@ -129,17 +129,131 @@ static void remove_ticket_handler(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+ kfree(th);
+ }
+
++static int process_one_ticket(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
++ struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,
++ void **p, void *end,
++ void *dbuf, void *ticket_buf)
++{
++ struct ceph_x_info *xi = ac->private;
++ int type;
++ u8 tkt_struct_v, blob_struct_v;
++ struct ceph_x_ticket_handler *th;
++ void *dp, *dend;
++ int dlen;
++ char is_enc;
++ struct timespec validity;
++ struct ceph_crypto_key old_key;
++ void *tp, *tpend;
++ struct ceph_timespec new_validity;
++ struct ceph_crypto_key new_session_key;
++ struct ceph_buffer *new_ticket_blob;
++ unsigned long new_expires, new_renew_after;
++ u64 new_secret_id;
++ int ret;
++
++ ceph_decode_need(p, end, sizeof(u32) + 1, bad);
++
++ type = ceph_decode_32(p);
++ dout(" ticket type %d %s\n", type, ceph_entity_type_name(type));
++
++ tkt_struct_v = ceph_decode_8(p);
++ if (tkt_struct_v != 1)
++ goto bad;
++
++ th = get_ticket_handler(ac, type);
++ if (IS_ERR(th)) {
++ ret = PTR_ERR(th);
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++ /* blob for me */
++ dlen = ceph_x_decrypt(secret, p, end, dbuf,
++ TEMP_TICKET_BUF_LEN);
++ if (dlen <= 0) {
++ ret = dlen;
++ goto out;
++ }
++ dout(" decrypted %d bytes\n", dlen);
++ dp = dbuf;
++ dend = dp + dlen;
++
++ tkt_struct_v = ceph_decode_8(&dp);
++ if (tkt_struct_v != 1)
++ goto bad;
++
++ memcpy(&old_key, &th->session_key, sizeof(old_key));
++ ret = ceph_crypto_key_decode(&new_session_key, &dp, dend);
++ if (ret)
++ goto out;
++
++ ceph_decode_copy(&dp, &new_validity, sizeof(new_validity));
++ ceph_decode_timespec(&validity, &new_validity);
++ new_expires = get_seconds() + validity.tv_sec;
++ new_renew_after = new_expires - (validity.tv_sec / 4);
++ dout(" expires=%lu renew_after=%lu\n", new_expires,
++ new_renew_after);
++
++ /* ticket blob for service */
++ ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, is_enc, bad);
++ tp = ticket_buf;
++ if (is_enc) {
++ /* encrypted */
++ dout(" encrypted ticket\n");
++ dlen = ceph_x_decrypt(&old_key, p, end, ticket_buf,
++ TEMP_TICKET_BUF_LEN);
++ if (dlen < 0) {
++ ret = dlen;
++ goto out;
++ }
++ dlen = ceph_decode_32(&tp);
++ } else {
++ /* unencrypted */
++ ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, dlen, bad);
++ ceph_decode_need(p, end, dlen, bad);
++ ceph_decode_copy(p, ticket_buf, dlen);
++ }
++ tpend = tp + dlen;
++ dout(" ticket blob is %d bytes\n", dlen);
++ ceph_decode_need(&tp, tpend, 1 + sizeof(u64), bad);
++ blob_struct_v = ceph_decode_8(&tp);
++ new_secret_id = ceph_decode_64(&tp);
++ ret = ceph_decode_buffer(&new_ticket_blob, &tp, tpend);
++ if (ret)
++ goto out;
++
++ /* all is well, update our ticket */
++ ceph_crypto_key_destroy(&th->session_key);
++ if (th->ticket_blob)
++ ceph_buffer_put(th->ticket_blob);
++ th->session_key = new_session_key;
++ th->ticket_blob = new_ticket_blob;
++ th->validity = new_validity;
++ th->secret_id = new_secret_id;
++ th->expires = new_expires;
++ th->renew_after = new_renew_after;
++ dout(" got ticket service %d (%s) secret_id %lld len %d\n",
++ type, ceph_entity_type_name(type), th->secret_id,
++ (int)th->ticket_blob->vec.iov_len);
++ xi->have_keys |= th->service;
++
++out:
++ return ret;
++
++bad:
++ ret = -EINVAL;
++ goto out;
++}
++
+ static int ceph_x_proc_ticket_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+ struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,
+ void *buf, void *end)
+ {
+- struct ceph_x_info *xi = ac->private;
+- int num;
+ void *p = buf;
+- int ret;
+ char *dbuf;
+ char *ticket_buf;
+ u8 reply_struct_v;
++ u32 num;
++ int ret;
+
+ dbuf = kmalloc(TEMP_TICKET_BUF_LEN, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!dbuf)
+@@ -150,112 +264,18 @@ static int ceph_x_proc_ticket_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+ if (!ticket_buf)
+ goto out_dbuf;
+
+- ceph_decode_need(&p, end, 1 + sizeof(u32), bad);
+- reply_struct_v = ceph_decode_8(&p);
++ ceph_decode_8_safe(&p, end, reply_struct_v, bad);
+ if (reply_struct_v != 1)
+- goto bad;
+- num = ceph_decode_32(&p);
+- dout("%d tickets\n", num);
+- while (num--) {
+- int type;
+- u8 tkt_struct_v, blob_struct_v;
+- struct ceph_x_ticket_handler *th;
+- void *dp, *dend;
+- int dlen;
+- char is_enc;
+- struct timespec validity;
+- struct ceph_crypto_key old_key;
+- void *tp, *tpend;
+- struct ceph_timespec new_validity;
+- struct ceph_crypto_key new_session_key;
+- struct ceph_buffer *new_ticket_blob;
+- unsigned long new_expires, new_renew_after;
+- u64 new_secret_id;
+-
+- ceph_decode_need(&p, end, sizeof(u32) + 1, bad);
+-
+- type = ceph_decode_32(&p);
+- dout(" ticket type %d %s\n", type, ceph_entity_type_name(type));
+-
+- tkt_struct_v = ceph_decode_8(&p);
+- if (tkt_struct_v != 1)
+- goto bad;
+-
+- th = get_ticket_handler(ac, type);
+- if (IS_ERR(th)) {
+- ret = PTR_ERR(th);
+- goto out;
+- }
+-
+- /* blob for me */
+- dlen = ceph_x_decrypt(secret, &p, end, dbuf,
+- TEMP_TICKET_BUF_LEN);
+- if (dlen <= 0) {
+- ret = dlen;
+- goto out;
+- }
+- dout(" decrypted %d bytes\n", dlen);
+- dend = dbuf + dlen;
+- dp = dbuf;
+-
+- tkt_struct_v = ceph_decode_8(&dp);
+- if (tkt_struct_v != 1)
+- goto bad;
++ return -EINVAL;
+
+- memcpy(&old_key, &th->session_key, sizeof(old_key));
+- ret = ceph_crypto_key_decode(&new_session_key, &dp, dend);
+- if (ret)
+- goto out;
++ ceph_decode_32_safe(&p, end, num, bad);
++ dout("%d tickets\n", num);
+
+- ceph_decode_copy(&dp, &new_validity, sizeof(new_validity));
+- ceph_decode_timespec(&validity, &new_validity);
+- new_expires = get_seconds() + validity.tv_sec;
+- new_renew_after = new_expires - (validity.tv_sec / 4);
+- dout(" expires=%lu renew_after=%lu\n", new_expires,
+- new_renew_after);
+-
+- /* ticket blob for service */
+- ceph_decode_8_safe(&p, end, is_enc, bad);
+- tp = ticket_buf;
+- if (is_enc) {
+- /* encrypted */
+- dout(" encrypted ticket\n");
+- dlen = ceph_x_decrypt(&old_key, &p, end, ticket_buf,
+- TEMP_TICKET_BUF_LEN);
+- if (dlen < 0) {
+- ret = dlen;
+- goto out;
+- }
+- dlen = ceph_decode_32(&tp);
+- } else {
+- /* unencrypted */
+- ceph_decode_32_safe(&p, end, dlen, bad);
+- ceph_decode_need(&p, end, dlen, bad);
+- ceph_decode_copy(&p, ticket_buf, dlen);
+- }
+- tpend = tp + dlen;
+- dout(" ticket blob is %d bytes\n", dlen);
+- ceph_decode_need(&tp, tpend, 1 + sizeof(u64), bad);
+- blob_struct_v = ceph_decode_8(&tp);
+- new_secret_id = ceph_decode_64(&tp);
+- ret = ceph_decode_buffer(&new_ticket_blob, &tp, tpend);
++ while (num--) {
++ ret = process_one_ticket(ac, secret, &p, end,
++ dbuf, ticket_buf);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+-
+- /* all is well, update our ticket */
+- ceph_crypto_key_destroy(&th->session_key);
+- if (th->ticket_blob)
+- ceph_buffer_put(th->ticket_blob);
+- th->session_key = new_session_key;
+- th->ticket_blob = new_ticket_blob;
+- th->validity = new_validity;
+- th->secret_id = new_secret_id;
+- th->expires = new_expires;
+- th->renew_after = new_renew_after;
+- dout(" got ticket service %d (%s) secret_id %lld len %d\n",
+- type, ceph_entity_type_name(type), th->secret_id,
+- (int)th->ticket_blob->vec.iov_len);
+- xi->have_keys |= th->service;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
Added: dists/wheezy/linux/debian/patches/bugfix/all/libceph-do-not-hard-code-max-auth-ticket-len.patch
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ dists/wheezy/linux/debian/patches/bugfix/all/libceph-do-not-hard-code-max-auth-ticket-len.patch Wed Sep 24 02:35:12 2014 (r21898)
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+From: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov at inktank.com>
+Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2014 19:39:15 +0400
+Subject: libceph: do not hard code max auth ticket len
+Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/c27a3e4d667fdcad3db7b104f75659478e0c68d8
+
+We hard code cephx auth ticket buffer size to 256 bytes. This isn't
+enough for any moderate setups and, in case tickets themselves are not
+encrypted, leads to buffer overflows (ceph_x_decrypt() errors out, but
+ceph_decode_copy() doesn't - it's just a memcpy() wrapper). Since the
+buffer is allocated dynamically anyway, allocated it a bit later, at
+the point where we know how much is going to be needed.
+
+Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/8979
+
+Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov at inktank.com>
+Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage at redhat.com>
+---
+ net/ceph/auth_x.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ceph/auth_x.c
++++ b/net/ceph/auth_x.c
+@@ -13,8 +13,6 @@
+ #include "auth_x.h"
+ #include "auth_x_protocol.h"
+
+-#define TEMP_TICKET_BUF_LEN 256
+-
+ static void ceph_x_validate_tickets(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, int *pneed);
+
+ static int ceph_x_is_authenticated(struct ceph_auth_client *ac)
+@@ -64,7 +62,7 @@ static int ceph_x_encrypt(struct ceph_cr
+ }
+
+ static int ceph_x_decrypt(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,
+- void **p, void *end, void *obuf, size_t olen)
++ void **p, void *end, void **obuf, size_t olen)
+ {
+ struct ceph_x_encrypt_header head;
+ size_t head_len = sizeof(head);
+@@ -75,8 +73,14 @@ static int ceph_x_decrypt(struct ceph_cr
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ dout("ceph_x_decrypt len %d\n", len);
+- ret = ceph_decrypt2(secret, &head, &head_len, obuf, &olen,
+- *p, len);
++ if (*obuf == NULL) {
++ *obuf = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
++ if (!*obuf)
++ return -ENOMEM;
++ olen = len;
++ }
++
++ ret = ceph_decrypt2(secret, &head, &head_len, *obuf, &olen, *p, len);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ if (head.struct_v != 1 || le64_to_cpu(head.magic) != CEPHX_ENC_MAGIC)
+@@ -131,18 +135,19 @@ static void remove_ticket_handler(struct
+
+ static int process_one_ticket(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+ struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,
+- void **p, void *end,
+- void *dbuf, void *ticket_buf)
++ void **p, void *end)
+ {
+ struct ceph_x_info *xi = ac->private;
+ int type;
+ u8 tkt_struct_v, blob_struct_v;
+ struct ceph_x_ticket_handler *th;
++ void *dbuf = NULL;
+ void *dp, *dend;
+ int dlen;
+ char is_enc;
+ struct timespec validity;
+ struct ceph_crypto_key old_key;
++ void *ticket_buf = NULL;
+ void *tp, *tpend;
+ struct ceph_timespec new_validity;
+ struct ceph_crypto_key new_session_key;
+@@ -167,8 +172,7 @@ static int process_one_ticket(struct cep
+ }
+
+ /* blob for me */
+- dlen = ceph_x_decrypt(secret, p, end, dbuf,
+- TEMP_TICKET_BUF_LEN);
++ dlen = ceph_x_decrypt(secret, p, end, &dbuf, 0);
+ if (dlen <= 0) {
+ ret = dlen;
+ goto out;
+@@ -195,20 +199,25 @@ static int process_one_ticket(struct cep
+
+ /* ticket blob for service */
+ ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, is_enc, bad);
+- tp = ticket_buf;
+ if (is_enc) {
+ /* encrypted */
+ dout(" encrypted ticket\n");
+- dlen = ceph_x_decrypt(&old_key, p, end, ticket_buf,
+- TEMP_TICKET_BUF_LEN);
++ dlen = ceph_x_decrypt(&old_key, p, end, &ticket_buf, 0);
+ if (dlen < 0) {
+ ret = dlen;
+ goto out;
+ }
++ tp = ticket_buf;
+ dlen = ceph_decode_32(&tp);
+ } else {
+ /* unencrypted */
+ ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, dlen, bad);
++ ticket_buf = kmalloc(dlen, GFP_NOFS);
++ if (!ticket_buf) {
++ ret = -ENOMEM;
++ goto out;
++ }
++ tp = ticket_buf;
+ ceph_decode_need(p, end, dlen, bad);
+ ceph_decode_copy(p, ticket_buf, dlen);
+ }
+@@ -237,6 +246,8 @@ static int process_one_ticket(struct cep
+ xi->have_keys |= th->service;
+
+ out:
++ kfree(ticket_buf);
++ kfree(dbuf);
+ return ret;
+
+ bad:
+@@ -249,21 +260,10 @@ static int ceph_x_proc_ticket_reply(stru
+ void *buf, void *end)
+ {
+ void *p = buf;
+- char *dbuf;
+- char *ticket_buf;
+ u8 reply_struct_v;
+ u32 num;
+ int ret;
+
+- dbuf = kmalloc(TEMP_TICKET_BUF_LEN, GFP_NOFS);
+- if (!dbuf)
+- return -ENOMEM;
+-
+- ret = -ENOMEM;
+- ticket_buf = kmalloc(TEMP_TICKET_BUF_LEN, GFP_NOFS);
+- if (!ticket_buf)
+- goto out_dbuf;
+-
+ ceph_decode_8_safe(&p, end, reply_struct_v, bad);
+ if (reply_struct_v != 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+@@ -272,22 +272,15 @@ static int ceph_x_proc_ticket_reply(stru
+ dout("%d tickets\n", num);
+
+ while (num--) {
+- ret = process_one_ticket(ac, secret, &p, end,
+- dbuf, ticket_buf);
++ ret = process_one_ticket(ac, secret, &p, end);
+ if (ret)
+- goto out;
++ return ret;
+ }
+
+- ret = 0;
+-out:
+- kfree(ticket_buf);
+-out_dbuf:
+- kfree(dbuf);
+- return ret;
++ return 0;
+
+ bad:
+- ret = -EINVAL;
+- goto out;
++ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ static int ceph_x_build_authorizer(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+@@ -583,13 +576,14 @@ static int ceph_x_verify_authorizer_repl
+ struct ceph_x_ticket_handler *th;
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct ceph_x_authorize_reply reply;
++ void *preply = &reply;
+ void *p = au->reply_buf;
+ void *end = p + sizeof(au->reply_buf);
+
+ th = get_ticket_handler(ac, au->service);
+ if (IS_ERR(th))
+ return PTR_ERR(th);
+- ret = ceph_x_decrypt(&th->session_key, &p, end, &reply, sizeof(reply));
++ ret = ceph_x_decrypt(&th->session_key, &p, end, &preply, sizeof(reply));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ if (ret != sizeof(reply))
Added: dists/wheezy/linux/debian/patches/bugfix/all/udf-Avoid-infinite-loop-when-processing-indirect-ICB.patch
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ dists/wheezy/linux/debian/patches/bugfix/all/udf-Avoid-infinite-loop-when-processing-indirect-ICB.patch Wed Sep 24 02:35:12 2014 (r21898)
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+From: Jan Kara <jack at suse.cz>
+Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2014 14:06:55 +0200
+Subject: udf: Avoid infinite loop when processing indirect ICBs
+Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/c03aa9f6e1f938618e6db2e23afef0574efeeb65
+
+We did not implement any bound on number of indirect ICBs we follow when
+loading inode. Thus corrupted medium could cause kernel to go into an
+infinite loop, possibly causing a stack overflow.
+
+Fix the possible stack overflow by removing recursion from
+__udf_read_inode() and limit number of indirect ICBs we follow to avoid
+infinite loops.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack at suse.cz>
+[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
+---
+ fs/udf/inode.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/udf/inode.c
++++ b/fs/udf/inode.c
+@@ -1176,13 +1176,22 @@ update_time:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++/*
++ * Maximum length of linked list formed by ICB hierarchy. The chosen number is
++ * arbitrary - just that we hopefully don't limit any real use of rewritten
++ * inode on write-once media but avoid looping for too long on corrupted media.
++ */
++#define UDF_MAX_ICB_NESTING 1024
++
+ static void __udf_read_inode(struct inode *inode)
+ {
+ struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
+ struct fileEntry *fe;
+ uint16_t ident;
+ struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
++ unsigned int indirections = 0;
+
++reread:
+ /*
+ * Set defaults, but the inode is still incomplete!
+ * Note: get_new_inode() sets the following on a new inode:
+@@ -1219,28 +1228,26 @@ static void __udf_read_inode(struct inod
+ ibh = udf_read_ptagged(inode->i_sb, &iinfo->i_location, 1,
+ &ident);
+ if (ident == TAG_IDENT_IE && ibh) {
+- struct buffer_head *nbh = NULL;
+ struct kernel_lb_addr loc;
+ struct indirectEntry *ie;
+
+ ie = (struct indirectEntry *)ibh->b_data;
+ loc = lelb_to_cpu(ie->indirectICB.extLocation);
+
+- if (ie->indirectICB.extLength &&
+- (nbh = udf_read_ptagged(inode->i_sb, &loc, 0,
+- &ident))) {
+- if (ident == TAG_IDENT_FE ||
+- ident == TAG_IDENT_EFE) {
+- memcpy(&iinfo->i_location,
+- &loc,
+- sizeof(struct kernel_lb_addr));
+- brelse(bh);
+- brelse(ibh);
+- brelse(nbh);
+- __udf_read_inode(inode);
++ if (ie->indirectICB.extLength) {
++ brelse(bh);
++ brelse(ibh);
++ memcpy(&iinfo->i_location, &loc,
++ sizeof(struct kernel_lb_addr));
++ if (++indirections > UDF_MAX_ICB_NESTING) {
++ udf_err(inode->i_sb,
++ "too many ICBs in ICB hierarchy"
++ " (max %d supported)\n",
++ UDF_MAX_ICB_NESTING);
++ make_bad_inode(inode);
+ return;
+ }
+- brelse(nbh);
++ goto reread;
+ }
+ }
+ brelse(ibh);
Modified: dists/wheezy/linux/debian/patches/series
==============================================================================
--- dists/wheezy/linux/debian/patches/series Wed Sep 24 01:17:44 2014 (r21897)
+++ dists/wheezy/linux/debian/patches/series Wed Sep 24 02:35:12 2014 (r21898)
@@ -1133,3 +1133,6 @@
debian/nlattr-avoid-abi-change-in-3.2.61.patch
bugfix/all/nfsd-fix-acl-null-pointer-deref.patch
bugfix/all/ext4-fix-BUG_ON-in-mb_free_blocks.patch
+bugfix/all/udf-Avoid-infinite-loop-when-processing-indirect-ICB.patch
+bugfix/all/libceph-add-process_one_ticket-helper.patch
+bugfix/all/libceph-do-not-hard-code-max-auth-ticket-len.patch
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