[linux] 01/01: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument (CVE-2015-8543)

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benh pushed a commit to branch jessie-security
in repository linux.

commit b6f408316bca2747c9dbe76c05380df92b891c0d
Author: Ben Hutchings <ben at decadent.org.uk>
Date:   Mon Dec 14 21:07:15 2015 +0000

    net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument (CVE-2015-8543)
---
 debian/changelog                                   |  1 +
 ...alidation-for-the-socket-syscall-protocol.patch | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 debian/patches/series                              |  1 +
 3 files changed, 84 insertions(+)

diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog
index a37dc2a..60601fa 100644
--- a/debian/changelog
+++ b/debian/changelog
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ linux (3.16.7-ckt20-1+deb8u1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
   * splice: sendfile() at once fails for big files (Closes: #785189)
   * unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue (CVE-2013-7446)
   * Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents (CVE-2015-8374)
+  * net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument (CVE-2015-8543)
 
  -- Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil at debian.org>  Sun, 15 Nov 2015 10:01:10 +0100
 
diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/all/net-add-validation-for-the-socket-syscall-protocol.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/net-add-validation-for-the-socket-syscall-protocol.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5833731
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/net-add-validation-for-the-socket-syscall-protocol.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes at stressinduktion.org>
+Subject: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
+Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2015 17:17:49 +0100
+Origin: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/391482
+
+郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
+using a simple program:
+
+	int socket_fd;
+	struct sockaddr_in addr;
+	addr.sin_port = 0;
+	addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
+	addr.sin_family = 10;
+
+	socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
+	connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
+
+AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
+identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
+thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
+store a zero in the protocol fields.
+
+This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
+the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
+is NULL for raw sockets.
+
+kernel: Call Trace:
+kernel:  [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
+kernel:  [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
+kernel:  [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
+kernel:  [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
+kernel:  [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
+kernel:  [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
+kernel:  [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
+
+I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
+
+CVE: CVE-2015-8543
+Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang at 360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes at stressinduktion.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/af_inet.c  | 3 +++
+ net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 3 +++
+ net/socket.c        | 3 +++
+ 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
+@@ -259,6 +259,9 @@ static int inet_create(struct net *net,
+ 	int try_loading_module = 0;
+ 	int err;
+ 
++	if (protocol >= IPPROTO_MAX)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
+ 	sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
+ 
+ 	/* Look for the requested type/protocol pair. */
+--- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
+@@ -109,6 +109,9 @@ static int inet6_create(struct net *net,
+ 	int try_loading_module = 0;
+ 	int err;
+ 
++	if (protocol >= IPPROTO_MAX)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
+ 	/* Look for the requested type/protocol pair. */
+ lookup_protocol:
+ 	err = -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
+--- a/net/socket.c
++++ b/net/socket.c
+@@ -1254,6 +1254,9 @@ int __sock_create(struct net *net, int f
+ 		return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+ 	if (type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
++	/* upper bound should be tested by per-protocol .create callbacks */
++	if (protocol < 0)
++		return -EINVAL;
+ 
+ 	/* Compatibility.
+ 
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
index bff7de3..aafb392 100644
--- a/debian/patches/series
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -649,3 +649,4 @@ bugfix/all/media-usbvision-fix-crash-on-detecting-device-with-i.patch
 bugfix/all/unix-avoid-use-after-free-in-ep_remove_wait_queue.patch
 debian/af_unix-avoid-abi-changes.patch
 bugfix/all/btrfs-fix-truncation-of-compressed-and-inlined-exten.patch
+bugfix/all/net-add-validation-for-the-socket-syscall-protocol.patch

-- 
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