[linux] 01/04: netfilter: x_tables: Fix parsing of IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE blobs (CVE-2016-3134)

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Wed Apr 13 20:27:10 UTC 2016


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in repository linux.

commit d0292c6f6773f5401ab4d587c1070563009b03d6
Author: Ben Hutchings <ben at decadent.org.uk>
Date:   Wed Apr 13 21:10:42 2016 +0100

    netfilter: x_tables: Fix parsing of IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE blobs (CVE-2016-3134)
---
 debian/changelog                                   |   3 +
 ..._tables-make-sure-e-next_offset-covers-re.patch |  88 +++++++++
 ...r-x_tables-validate-e-target_offset-early.patch | 197 +++++++++++++++++++++
 debian/patches/series                              |   2 +
 4 files changed, 290 insertions(+)

diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog
index e704661..451922e 100644
--- a/debian/changelog
+++ b/debian/changelog
@@ -233,6 +233,9 @@ linux (4.5.1-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
   * linux-support: Include udeb configuration from debian/installer for use
     by the linux-signed package
   * Set ABI to 1
+  * netfilter: x_tables: Fix parsing of IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE blobs (CVE-2016-3134)
+    - validate e->target_offset early
+    - make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
 
   [ Aurelien Jarno ]
   * [mipsel/mips/config.loongson-2f] Disable VIDEO_CX23885, VIDEO_IVTV,
diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/all/netfilter-x_tables-make-sure-e-next_offset-covers-re.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/netfilter-x_tables-make-sure-e-next_offset-covers-re.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5b29f88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/netfilter-x_tables-make-sure-e-next_offset-covers-re.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+From: Florian Westphal <fw at strlen.de>
+Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2016 18:02:50 +0100
+Subject: [2/2] netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining
+ blob size
+Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/6e94e0cfb0887e4013b3b930fa6ab1fe6bb6ba91
+
+Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
+
+Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw at strlen.de>
+Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo at netfilter.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 6 ++++--
+ net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c  | 6 ++++--
+ net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 6 ++++--
+ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
+index 830bbe8ec13d..51d4fe56b807 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
+@@ -573,7 +573,8 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
+ 	int err;
+ 
+ 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 ||
+-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit) {
++	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit ||
++	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
+ 		duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+@@ -1232,7 +1233,8 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,
+ 
+ 	duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
+ 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_arpt_entry) != 0 ||
+-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) >= limit) {
++	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) >= limit ||
++	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
+ 		duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+index 1d72a3c4a7e7..fb7694e6663e 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+@@ -738,7 +738,8 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
+ 	int err;
+ 
+ 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ipt_entry) != 0 ||
+-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit) {
++	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit ||
++	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
+ 		duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+@@ -1492,7 +1493,8 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
+ 
+ 	duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
+ 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ipt_entry) != 0 ||
+-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) >= limit) {
++	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) >= limit ||
++	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
+ 		duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+index 26a5ad1cc4fd..b248528f2a17 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+@@ -750,7 +750,8 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
+ 	int err;
+ 
+ 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
+-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit) {
++	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit ||
++	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
+ 		duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+@@ -1504,7 +1505,8 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
+ 
+ 	duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
+ 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
+-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) >= limit) {
++	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) >= limit ||
++	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
+ 		duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/all/netfilter-x_tables-validate-e-target_offset-early.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/netfilter-x_tables-validate-e-target_offset-early.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6db0739
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/netfilter-x_tables-validate-e-target_offset-early.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+From: Florian Westphal <fw at strlen.de>
+Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2016 18:02:49 +0100
+Subject: [1/2] netfilter: x_tables: validate e->target_offset early
+Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/bdf533de6968e9686df777dc178486f600c6e617
+
+We should check that e->target_offset is sane before
+mark_source_chains gets called since it will fetch the target entry
+for loop detection.
+
+Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw at strlen.de>
+Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo at netfilter.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 17 ++++++++---------
+ net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c  | 17 ++++++++---------
+ net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 17 ++++++++---------
+ 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
+index bf081927e06b..830bbe8ec13d 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
+@@ -474,14 +474,12 @@ next:
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
+-static inline int check_entry(const struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name)
++static inline int check_entry(const struct arpt_entry *e)
+ {
+ 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
+ 
+-	if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp)) {
+-		duprintf("arp_tables: arp check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
++	if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp))
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+-	}
+ 
+ 	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) > e->next_offset)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+@@ -522,10 +520,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name, unsigned int size)
+ 	struct xt_target *target;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	ret = check_entry(e, name);
+-	if (ret)
+-		return ret;
+-
+ 	e->counters.pcnt = xt_percpu_counter_alloc();
+ 	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(e->counters.pcnt))
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+@@ -576,6 +570,7 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
+ 					     unsigned int valid_hooks)
+ {
+ 	unsigned int h;
++	int err;
+ 
+ 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 ||
+ 	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit) {
+@@ -590,6 +585,10 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+ 
++	err = check_entry(e);
++	if (err)
++		return err;
++
+ 	/* Check hooks & underflows */
+ 	for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
+ 		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
+@@ -1246,7 +1245,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
+-	ret = check_entry((struct arpt_entry *)e, name);
++	ret = check_entry((struct arpt_entry *)e);
+ 	if (ret)
+ 		return ret;
+ 
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+index e53f8d6f326d..1d72a3c4a7e7 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+@@ -569,14 +569,12 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net)
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-check_entry(const struct ipt_entry *e, const char *name)
++check_entry(const struct ipt_entry *e)
+ {
+ 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
+ 
+-	if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip)) {
+-		duprintf("ip check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
++	if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip))
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+-	}
+ 
+ 	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) >
+ 	    e->next_offset)
+@@ -666,10 +664,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct ipt_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name,
+ 	struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
+ 	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
+ 
+-	ret = check_entry(e, name);
+-	if (ret)
+-		return ret;
+-
+ 	e->counters.pcnt = xt_percpu_counter_alloc();
+ 	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(e->counters.pcnt))
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+@@ -741,6 +735,7 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
+ 			   unsigned int valid_hooks)
+ {
+ 	unsigned int h;
++	int err;
+ 
+ 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ipt_entry) != 0 ||
+ 	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit) {
+@@ -755,6 +750,10 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+ 
++	err = check_entry(e);
++	if (err)
++		return err;
++
+ 	/* Check hooks & underflows */
+ 	for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
+ 		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
+@@ -1506,7 +1505,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
+-	ret = check_entry((struct ipt_entry *)e, name);
++	ret = check_entry((struct ipt_entry *)e);
+ 	if (ret)
+ 		return ret;
+ 
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+index 84f9baf7aee8..26a5ad1cc4fd 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+@@ -581,14 +581,12 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net)
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-check_entry(const struct ip6t_entry *e, const char *name)
++check_entry(const struct ip6t_entry *e)
+ {
+ 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
+ 
+-	if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6)) {
+-		duprintf("ip_tables: ip check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
++	if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6))
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+-	}
+ 
+ 	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) >
+ 	    e->next_offset)
+@@ -679,10 +677,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct ip6t_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name,
+ 	struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
+ 	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
+ 
+-	ret = check_entry(e, name);
+-	if (ret)
+-		return ret;
+-
+ 	e->counters.pcnt = xt_percpu_counter_alloc();
+ 	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(e->counters.pcnt))
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+@@ -753,6 +747,7 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
+ 			   unsigned int valid_hooks)
+ {
+ 	unsigned int h;
++	int err;
+ 
+ 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
+ 	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit) {
+@@ -767,6 +762,10 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+ 
++	err = check_entry(e);
++	if (err)
++		return err;
++
+ 	/* Check hooks & underflows */
+ 	for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
+ 		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
+@@ -1518,7 +1517,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
+-	ret = check_entry((struct ip6t_entry *)e, name);
++	ret = check_entry((struct ip6t_entry *)e);
+ 	if (ret)
+ 		return ret;
+ 
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
index 811e0d3..2d13011 100644
--- a/debian/patches/series
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -138,3 +138,5 @@ bugfix/all/tools-build-remove-bpf-run-time-check-at-build-time.patch
 bugfix/all/power-cpupower-fix-manpages-NAME.patch
 bugfix/all/tools-lib-traceevent-fix-use-of-uninitialized-variables.patch
 bugfix/all/scripts-fix-x.509-pem-support-in-sign-file.patch
+bugfix/all/netfilter-x_tables-validate-e-target_offset-early.patch
+bugfix/all/netfilter-x_tables-make-sure-e-next_offset-covers-re.patch

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