[linux] 01/01: Update to 4.4.1
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debian-kernel at lists.debian.org
Mon Feb 1 10:59:52 UTC 2016
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commit 1ba618c3d3a87df99d39a28dfda677e24d8f959c
Author: Ben Hutchings <ben at decadent.org.uk>
Date: Mon Feb 1 10:59:35 2016 +0000
Update to 4.4.1
---
debian/changelog | 5 +-
...-keyring-ref-leak-in-join_session_keyring.patch | 75 -----------
...ly-account-for-FDs-passed-over-unix-socke.patch | 140 ---------------------
debian/patches/series | 2 -
4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 218 deletions(-)
diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog
index 5e99078..8b03edb 100644
--- a/debian/changelog
+++ b/debian/changelog
@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
-linux (4.4-1~exp2) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
+linux (4.4.1-1~exp1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
+
+ * New upstream stable update:
+ https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/ChangeLog-4.4.1
[ Ricardo Salveti ]
* Extending ARM64 support:
diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/all/KEYS-Fix-keyring-ref-leak-in-join_session_keyring.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/KEYS-Fix-keyring-ref-leak-in-join_session_keyring.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9c6a969..0000000
--- a/debian/patches/bugfix/all/KEYS-Fix-keyring-ref-leak-in-join_session_keyring.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-From 7ca88764d45c209791e8813131c1457c2e9e51e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Yevgeny Pats <yevgeny at perception-point.io>
-Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 12:05:28 +0000
-Subject: KEYS: Fix keyring ref leak in join_session_keyring()
-
-If a thread is asked to join as a session keyring the keyring that's already
-set as its session, we leak a keyring reference.
-
-This can be tested with the following program:
-
- #include <stddef.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <keyutils.h>
-
- int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
- {
- int i = 0;
- key_serial_t serial;
-
- serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
- "leaked-keyring");
- if (serial < 0) {
- perror("keyctl");
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, serial,
- KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL) < 0) {
- perror("keyctl");
- return -1;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
- serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
- "leaked-keyring");
- if (serial < 0) {
- perror("keyctl");
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
- }
-
-If, after the program has run, there something like the following line in
-/proc/keys:
-
-3f3d898f I--Q--- 100 perm 3f3f0000 0 0 keyring leaked-keyring: empty
-
-with a usage count of 100 * the number of times the program has been run,
-then the kernel is malfunctioning. If leaked-keyring has zero usages or
-has been garbage collected, then the problem is fixed.
-
-Reported-by: Yevgeny Pats <yevgeny at perception-point.io>
-Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
----
- security/keys/process_keys.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
-index a3f85d2..e6d50172 100644
---- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
-+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
-@@ -794,6 +794,7 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
- ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
- goto error2;
- } else if (keyring == new->session_keyring) {
-+ key_put(keyring);
- ret = 0;
- goto error2;
- }
---
-2.7.0.rc3
-
diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/all/unix-properly-account-for-FDs-passed-over-unix-socke.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/unix-properly-account-for-FDs-passed-over-unix-socke.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8cd6bb4..0000000
--- a/debian/patches/bugfix/all/unix-properly-account-for-FDs-passed-over-unix-socke.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,140 +0,0 @@
-From: willy tarreau <w at 1wt.eu>
-Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2016 07:54:56 +0100
-Subject: unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets
-Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/712f4aad406bb1ed67f3f98d04c044191f0ff593
-
-It is possible for a process to allocate and accumulate far more FDs than
-the process' limit by sending them over a unix socket then closing them
-to keep the process' fd count low.
-
-This change addresses this problem by keeping track of the number of FDs
-in flight per user and preventing non-privileged processes from having
-more FDs in flight than their configured FD limit.
-
-Reported-by: socketpair at gmail.com
-Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel at I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
-Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
-Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
-Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes at stressinduktion.org>
-Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w at 1wt.eu>
-Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem at davemloft.net>
----
- include/linux/sched.h | 1 +
- net/unix/af_unix.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
- net/unix/garbage.c | 13 ++++++++-----
- 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
-index edad7a4..fbf25f1 100644
---- a/include/linux/sched.h
-+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
-@@ -830,6 +830,7 @@ struct user_struct {
- unsigned long mq_bytes; /* How many bytes can be allocated to mqueue? */
- #endif
- unsigned long locked_shm; /* How many pages of mlocked shm ? */
-+ unsigned long unix_inflight; /* How many files in flight in unix sockets */
-
- #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
- struct key *uid_keyring; /* UID specific keyring */
-diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
-index ef05cd9..e3f85bc 100644
---- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
-+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
-@@ -1513,6 +1513,21 @@ static void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb)
- sock_wfree(skb);
- }
-
-+/*
-+ * The "user->unix_inflight" variable is protected by the garbage
-+ * collection lock, and we just read it locklessly here. If you go
-+ * over the limit, there might be a tiny race in actually noticing
-+ * it across threads. Tough.
-+ */
-+static inline bool too_many_unix_fds(struct task_struct *p)
-+{
-+ struct user_struct *user = current_user();
-+
-+ if (unlikely(user->unix_inflight > task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NOFILE)))
-+ return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
-+ return false;
-+}
-+
- #define MAX_RECURSION_LEVEL 4
-
- static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
-@@ -1521,6 +1536,9 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
- unsigned char max_level = 0;
- int unix_sock_count = 0;
-
-+ if (too_many_unix_fds(current))
-+ return -ETOOMANYREFS;
-+
- for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
- struct sock *sk = unix_get_socket(scm->fp->fp[i]);
-
-@@ -1542,10 +1560,8 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
- if (!UNIXCB(skb).fp)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
-- if (unix_sock_count) {
-- for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-- unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
-- }
-+ for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-+ unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
- return max_level;
- }
-
-diff --git a/net/unix/garbage.c b/net/unix/garbage.c
-index a73a226..8fcdc22 100644
---- a/net/unix/garbage.c
-+++ b/net/unix/garbage.c
-@@ -120,11 +120,11 @@ void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
- {
- struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
-
-+ spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
-+
- if (s) {
- struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
-
-- spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
--
- if (atomic_long_inc_return(&u->inflight) == 1) {
- BUG_ON(!list_empty(&u->link));
- list_add_tail(&u->link, &gc_inflight_list);
-@@ -132,25 +132,28 @@ void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
- BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
- }
- unix_tot_inflight++;
-- spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
- }
-+ fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight++;
-+ spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
- }
-
- void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp)
- {
- struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
-
-+ spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
-+
- if (s) {
- struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
-
-- spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
- BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
-
- if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&u->inflight))
- list_del_init(&u->link);
- unix_tot_inflight--;
-- spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
- }
-+ fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight--;
-+ spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
- }
-
- static void scan_inflight(struct sock *x, void (*func)(struct unix_sock *),
---
-2.7.0.rc3
-
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
index 8f38cab..785e203 100644
--- a/debian/patches/series
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -107,5 +107,3 @@ bugfix/all/media-usbvision-fix-crash-on-detecting-device-with-i.patch
bugfix/all/ptrace-being-capable-wrt-a-process-requires-mapped-uids-gids.patch
bugfix/all/usb-serial-visor-fix-crash-on-detecting-device-without-write_urbs.patch
bugfix/all/tty-fix-unsafe-ldisc-reference-via-ioctl-tiocgetd.patch
-bugfix/all/unix-properly-account-for-FDs-passed-over-unix-socke.patch
-bugfix/all/KEYS-Fix-keyring-ref-leak-in-join_session_keyring.patch
--
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