[linux] 05/11: Add patches for CVE-2017-7184
debian-kernel at lists.debian.org
debian-kernel at lists.debian.org
Wed Apr 26 23:25:01 UTC 2017
This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script.
benh pushed a commit to branch wheezy-security
in repository linux.
commit d97bf3dea4ea0a072d657a94d95e22569f65bd84
Author: Ben Hutchings <ben at decadent.org.uk>
Date: Wed Apr 26 23:20:25 2017 +0100
Add patches for CVE-2017-7184
---
debian/changelog | 3 ++
...e-xfrm_msg_newae-incoming-esn-size-harder.patch | 34 ++++++++++++++++
..._newae-xfrma_replay_esn_val-replay_window.patch | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++
debian/patches/series | 2 +
4 files changed, 84 insertions(+)
diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog
index 7ea7390..5d30803 100644
--- a/debian/changelog
+++ b/debian/changelog
@@ -178,6 +178,9 @@ linux (3.2.88-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
* KEYS: Disallow keyrings beginning with '.' to be joined as session keyrings
(CVE-2016-9604)
* ping: implement proper locking (CVE-2017-2671)
+ * xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL replay_window
+ (CVE-2017-7184)
+ * xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE incoming ESN size harder (CVE-2017-7184)
-- Ben Hutchings <ben at decadent.org.uk> Mon, 13 Mar 2017 23:12:35 +0000
diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/all/xfrm_user-validate-xfrm_msg_newae-incoming-esn-size-harder.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/xfrm_user-validate-xfrm_msg_newae-incoming-esn-size-harder.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59f64e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/xfrm_user-validate-xfrm_msg_newae-incoming-esn-size-harder.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From: Andy Whitcroft <apw at canonical.com>
+Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 07:45:44 +0000
+Subject: [2/2] xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE incoming ESN size harder
+Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/f843ee6dd019bcece3e74e76ad9df0155655d0df
+Bug-Debian-Security: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2017-7184
+
+Kees Cook has pointed out that xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() is subject to
+wrapping issues. To ensure we are correctly ensuring that the two ESN
+structures are the same size compare both the overall size as reported
+by xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() and the internal length are the same.
+
+CVE-2017-7184
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw at canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert at secunet.com>
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
+---
+ net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 6 +++++-
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
++++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+@@ -390,7 +390,11 @@ static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len
+ up = nla_data(rp);
+ ulen = xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(up);
+
+- if (nla_len(rp) < ulen || xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen)
++ /* Check the overall length and the internal bitmap length to avoid
++ * potential overflow. */
++ if (nla_len(rp) < ulen ||
++ xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen ||
++ replay_esn->bmp_len != up->bmp_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (up->replay_window > up->bmp_len * sizeof(__u32) * 8)
diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/all/xfrm_user-validate-xfrm_msg_newae-xfrma_replay_esn_val-replay_window.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/xfrm_user-validate-xfrm_msg_newae-xfrma_replay_esn_val-replay_window.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..296b110
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/xfrm_user-validate-xfrm_msg_newae-xfrma_replay_esn_val-replay_window.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From: Andy Whitcroft <apw at canonical.com>
+Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 07:29:31 +0000
+Subject: [1/2] xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL
+ replay_window
+Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/677e806da4d916052585301785d847c3b3e6186a
+Bug-Debian-Security: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2017-7184
+
+When a new xfrm state is created during an XFRM_MSG_NEWSA call we
+validate the user supplied replay_esn to ensure that the size is valid
+and to ensure that the replay_window size is within the allocated
+buffer. However later it is possible to update this replay_esn via a
+XFRM_MSG_NEWAE call. There we again validate the size of the supplied
+buffer matches the existing state and if so inject the contents. We do
+not at this point check that the replay_window is within the allocated
+memory. This leads to out-of-bounds reads and writes triggered by
+netlink packets. This leads to memory corruption and the potential for
+priviledge escalation.
+
+We already attempt to validate the incoming replay information in
+xfrm_new_ae() via xfrm_replay_verify_len(). This confirms that the user
+is not trying to change the size of the replay state buffer which
+includes the replay_esn. It however does not check the replay_window
+remains within that buffer. Add validation of the contained
+replay_window.
+
+CVE-2017-7184
+Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw at canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert at secunet.com>
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
+---
+ net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
++++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+@@ -393,6 +393,9 @@ static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len
+ if (nla_len(rp) < ulen || xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
++ if (up->replay_window > up->bmp_len * sizeof(__u32) * 8)
++ return -EINVAL;
++
+ return 0;
+ }
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
index 06ef18a..bdfdd71 100644
--- a/debian/patches/series
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -1112,6 +1112,8 @@ bugfix/all/keys-special-dot-prefixed-keyring-name-bug-fix.patch
bugfix/all/keys-reinstate-eperm-for-a-key-type-name-beginning-w.patch
bugfix/all/keys-disallow-keyrings-beginning-with-.-to-be-joined.patch
bugfix/all/ping-implement-proper-locking.patch
+bugfix/all/xfrm_user-validate-xfrm_msg_newae-xfrma_replay_esn_val-replay_window.patch
+bugfix/all/xfrm_user-validate-xfrm_msg_newae-incoming-esn-size-harder.patch
# ABI maintenance
debian/perf-hide-abi-change-in-3.2.30.patch
--
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