[pkg-bacula-commits] [bacula] 01/03: Add patches to support OpenSSL 1.1
Carsten Leonhardt
leo at moszumanska.debian.org
Wed Nov 8 23:27:04 UTC 2017
This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script.
leo pushed a commit to branch openssl1.1
in repository bacula.
commit bca07ae9fcb3ea7bd77633d56391cb3f0f6b4063
Author: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian at breakpoint.cc>
Date: Thu Nov 9 00:20:59 2017 +0100
Add patches to support OpenSSL 1.1
kindly contributed by Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
<sebastian at breakpoint.cc>
---
debian/changelog | 4 +-
...crypto-remove-support-for-ancient-openssl.patch | 146 +++++++++++
...02-crypto-Add-a-tiny-OpenSSL-compat-level.patch | 95 +++++++
...penssl1.1_0003-crypto-Use-DEFINE_STACK_OF.patch | 42 ++++
...ert-EVP_MD_CTX-EVP_CIPHER_CTX-to-OpenSSL-.patch | 204 +++++++++++++++
...vert-EVP_PKEY-access-and-remainings-bits-.patch | 274 +++++++++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 764 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog
index 613ab6d..8c6957d 100644
--- a/debian/changelog
+++ b/debian/changelog
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
-bacula (9.0.5+dfsg-2) unstable; urgency=medium
+bacula (9.0.5+dfsg-2) experimental; urgency=medium
* Use "Rules-Requires-Root: no"
+ * Add patches to support OpenSSL 1.1 kindly contributed by Sebastian
+ Andrzej Siewior <sebastian at breakpoint.cc>
--
diff --git a/debian/patches/openssl1.1_0001-crypto-remove-support-for-ancient-openssl.patch b/debian/patches/openssl1.1_0001-crypto-remove-support-for-ancient-openssl.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e79249
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/openssl1.1_0001-crypto-remove-support-for-ancient-openssl.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+From 2da5f9b134943f62fb7c22e6d5e64599b43011cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian at breakpoint.cc>
+Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2017 14:37:31 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/5] crypto: remove support for ancient openssl
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+OpenSSL 1.0.2 is still supported. Everything earlier is not so the old
+code for compat can be thrown away, especially the 0.9.8 support.
+
+TLSv1_method() should not be used and SSLv23_method() should be
+preferred because the latter supports TLS1.0…1.2 while the former _only_
+tries TLS1.0.
+
+Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian at breakpoint.cc>
+---
+ src/lib/crypto.c | 22 ----------------------
+ src/lib/tls.c | 14 +-------------
+ 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 35 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/crypto.c b/src/lib/crypto.c
+index 9f309d58e473..b4403eb45618 100644
+--- a/src/lib/crypto.c
++++ b/src/lib/crypto.c
+@@ -307,12 +307,7 @@ static ASN1_OCTET_STRING *openssl_cert_keyid(X509 *cert) {
+ const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid;
+ int i;
+-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800FL)
+ const unsigned char *ext_value_data;
+-#else
+- unsigned char *ext_value_data;
+-#endif
+-
+
+ /* Find the index to the subjectKeyIdentifier extension */
+ i = X509_get_ext_by_NID(cert, NID_subject_key_identifier, -1);
+@@ -331,7 +326,6 @@ static ASN1_OCTET_STRING *openssl_cert_keyid(X509 *cert) {
+
+ ext_value_data = ext->value->data;
+
+-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L)
+ if (method->it) {
+ /* New style ASN1 */
+
+@@ -345,10 +339,6 @@ static ASN1_OCTET_STRING *openssl_cert_keyid(X509 *cert) {
+ keyid = (ASN1_OCTET_STRING *) method->d2i(NULL, &ext_value_data, ext->value->length);
+ }
+
+-#else
+- keyid = (ASN1_OCTET_STRING *) method->d2i(NULL, &ext_value_data, ext->value->length);
+-#endif
+-
+ return keyid;
+ }
+
+@@ -783,11 +773,7 @@ crypto_error_t crypto_sign_verify(SIGNATURE *sig, X509_KEYPAIR *keypair, DIGEST
+ SignerInfo *si;
+ int ok, i;
+ unsigned int sigLen;
+-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800FL)
+ const unsigned char *sigData;
+-#else
+- unsigned char *sigData;
+-#endif
+
+ signers = sig->sigData->signerInfo;
+
+@@ -934,11 +920,7 @@ int crypto_sign_encode(SIGNATURE *sig, uint8_t *dest, uint32_t *length)
+ SIGNATURE *crypto_sign_decode(JCR *jcr, const uint8_t *sigData, uint32_t length)
+ {
+ SIGNATURE *sig;
+-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800FL)
+ const unsigned char *p = (const unsigned char *) sigData;
+-#else
+- unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)sigData;
+-#endif
+
+ sig = (SIGNATURE *)malloc(sizeof(SIGNATURE));
+ if (!sig) {
+@@ -1156,11 +1138,7 @@ crypto_error_t crypto_session_decode(const uint8_t *data, uint32_t length, alist
+ X509_KEYPAIR *keypair;
+ STACK_OF(RecipientInfo) *recipients;
+ crypto_error_t retval = CRYPTO_ERROR_NONE;
+-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800FL)
+ const unsigned char *p = (const unsigned char *)data;
+-#else
+- unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)data;
+-#endif
+
+ /* bacula-fd.conf doesn't contains any key */
+ if (!keypairs) {
+diff --git a/src/lib/tls.c b/src/lib/tls.c
+index f444a276a5e2..992265b38ad2 100644
+--- a/src/lib/tls.c
++++ b/src/lib/tls.c
+@@ -118,13 +118,10 @@ TLS_CONTEXT *new_tls_context(const char *ca_certfile, const char *ca_certdir,
+ /* Allows SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 protocols */
+ ctx->openssl = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method());
+
+-#elif (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10000000L)
++#else
+ /* Allows most all protocols */
+ ctx->openssl = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method());
+
+-#else
+- /* Older method only understands TLSv1 */
+- ctx->openssl = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method());
+ #endif
+
+ /* Use SSL_OP_ALL to turn on all "rather harmless" workarounds that
+@@ -337,11 +334,7 @@ bool tls_postconnect_verify_host(JCR *jcr, TLS_CONNECTION *tls, const char *host
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *val;
+ CONF_VALUE *nval;
+ void *extstr = NULL;
+-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800FL)
+ const unsigned char *ext_value_data;
+-#else
+- unsigned char *ext_value_data;
+-#endif
+
+ /* Get x509 extension method structure */
+ if (!(method = X509V3_EXT_get(ext))) {
+@@ -350,7 +343,6 @@ bool tls_postconnect_verify_host(JCR *jcr, TLS_CONNECTION *tls, const char *host
+
+ ext_value_data = ext->value->data;
+
+-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L)
+ if (method->it) {
+ /* New style ASN1 */
+
+@@ -364,10 +356,6 @@ bool tls_postconnect_verify_host(JCR *jcr, TLS_CONNECTION *tls, const char *host
+ extstr = method->d2i(NULL, &ext_value_data, ext->value->length);
+ }
+
+-#else
+- extstr = method->d2i(NULL, &ext_value_data, ext->value->length);
+-#endif
+-
+ /* Iterate through to find the dNSName field(s) */
+ val = method->i2v(method, extstr, NULL);
+
+--
+2.15.0
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/openssl1.1_0002-crypto-Add-a-tiny-OpenSSL-compat-level.patch b/debian/patches/openssl1.1_0002-crypto-Add-a-tiny-OpenSSL-compat-level.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f8fec7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/openssl1.1_0002-crypto-Add-a-tiny-OpenSSL-compat-level.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+From bdcf77673aeac0cb1de81f4148c23328cae0f4f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian at breakpoint.cc>
+Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2017 14:40:12 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/5] crypto: Add a tiny OpenSSL compat level
+
+This header file provides a few OpenSSL 1.1 functions which are not
+available in OpenSSL 1.0.2 and earlier. The body of the function
+implements the pre-1.1 version of the function provided in 1.1.
+
+Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian at breakpoint.cc>
+---
+ src/lib/crypto.c | 2 ++
+ src/lib/openssl-compat.h | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ src/lib/tls.c | 2 ++
+ 3 files changed, 47 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 src/lib/openssl-compat.h
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/crypto.c b/src/lib/crypto.c
+index b4403eb45618..c172efb2b5d9 100644
+--- a/src/lib/crypto.c
++++ b/src/lib/crypto.c
+@@ -131,6 +131,8 @@
+ #ifdef HAVE_CRYPTO /* Is encryption enabled? */
+ #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL /* How about OpenSSL? */
+
++#include "openssl-compat.h"
++
+ /* ASN.1 Declarations */
+ #define BACULA_ASN1_VERSION 0
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/openssl-compat.h b/src/lib/openssl-compat.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000000..2effcb6bc9bb
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/src/lib/openssl-compat.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
++#ifndef __OPENSSL_COPMAT__H__
++#define __OPENSSL_COPMAT__H__
++
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
++static int EVP_PKEY_up_ref(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
++{
++ CRYPTO_add(&pkey->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
++ return 0;
++}
++
++static void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
++{
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
++}
++
++static void EVP_MD_CTX_reset(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
++{
++ EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx);
++}
++
++static EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void)
++{
++ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
++
++ ctx = (EVP_MD_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX));
++ if (ctx)
++ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX));
++ return ctx;
++}
++
++static void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
++{
++ EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx);
++ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
++}
++
++static const unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_get0_data(const ASN1_STRING *asn1)
++{
++ return asn1->data;
++}
++#endif
++
++#endif
+diff --git a/src/lib/tls.c b/src/lib/tls.c
+index 992265b38ad2..c71a4ad525fe 100644
+--- a/src/lib/tls.c
++++ b/src/lib/tls.c
+@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
+
+ #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL /* How about OpenSSL? */
+
++#include "openssl-compat.h"
++
+ /* No anonymous ciphers, no <128 bit ciphers, no export ciphers, no MD5 ciphers */
+ #define TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERS "ALL:!ADH:!LOW:!EXP:!MD5:@STRENGTH"
+
+--
+2.15.0
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/openssl1.1_0003-crypto-Use-DEFINE_STACK_OF.patch b/debian/patches/openssl1.1_0003-crypto-Use-DEFINE_STACK_OF.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a8cef1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/openssl1.1_0003-crypto-Use-DEFINE_STACK_OF.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From e8186c36805dcec1c9f4333a294288200a3ab9f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian at breakpoint.cc>
+Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2017 14:42:22 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/5] crypto: Use DEFINE_STACK_OF()
+
+OpenSSL 1.1 makes it possible to use DEFINE_STACK_OF() instead of
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF() + mkstack.pl's output.
+
+Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian at breakpoint.cc>
+---
+ src/lib/crypto.c | 7 +++++--
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/crypto.c b/src/lib/crypto.c
+index c172efb2b5d9..4b9f0f2a2f3a 100644
+--- a/src/lib/crypto.c
++++ b/src/lib/crypto.c
+@@ -194,9 +194,11 @@ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(SignerInfo)
+ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(RecipientInfo)
+ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(SignatureData)
+ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CryptoData)
+-IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SignerInfo)
+-IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(RecipientInfo)
+
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L)
++DEFINE_STACK_OF(SignerInfo);
++DEFINE_STACK_OF(RecipientInfo);
++#else
+ /*
+ * SignerInfo and RecipientInfo stack macros, generated by OpenSSL's util/mkstack.pl.
+ */
+@@ -260,6 +262,7 @@ IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(RecipientInfo)
+ #define ASN1_seq_unpack_RecipientInfo(buf, len, d2i_func, free_func) \
+ SKM_ASN1_seq_unpack(RecipientInfo, (buf), (len), (d2i_func), (free_func))
+ /* End of util/mkstack.pl block */
++#endif
+
+ /* X509 Public/Private Key Pair Structure */
+ struct X509_Keypair {
+--
+2.15.0
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/openssl1.1_0004-crypto-convert-EVP_MD_CTX-EVP_CIPHER_CTX-to-OpenSSL-.patch b/debian/patches/openssl1.1_0004-crypto-convert-EVP_MD_CTX-EVP_CIPHER_CTX-to-OpenSSL-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f6fae82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/openssl1.1_0004-crypto-convert-EVP_MD_CTX-EVP_CIPHER_CTX-to-OpenSSL-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+From 44a8f9083ac6e5ecc9ea199074695b425ab2b050 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian at breakpoint.cc>
+Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2017 21:01:45 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 4/5] crypto: convert EVP_MD_CTX + EVP_CIPHER_CTX to OpenSSL
+ 1.1
+
+Those digest structs became opaque and now they need to be allocated
+and for access we need to use accessor functions.
+
+Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian at breakpoint.cc>
+---
+ src/lib/crypto.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
+ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/crypto.c b/src/lib/crypto.c
+index 4b9f0f2a2f3a..1dae063697c7 100644
+--- a/src/lib/crypto.c
++++ b/src/lib/crypto.c
+@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ struct X509_Keypair {
+ struct Digest {
+ crypto_digest_t type;
+ JCR *jcr;
+- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
++ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
+ };
+
+ /* Message Signature Structure */
+@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ struct Crypto_Session {
+
+ /* Symmetric Cipher Context */
+ struct Cipher_Context {
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+ };
+
+ /* PEM Password Dispatch Context */
+@@ -590,7 +590,10 @@ DIGEST *crypto_digest_new(JCR *jcr, crypto_digest_t type)
+ Dmsg1(150, "crypto_digest_new jcr=%p\n", jcr);
+
+ /* Initialize the OpenSSL message digest context */
+- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&digest->ctx);
++ digest->ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
++ if (!digest->ctx)
++ goto err;
++ EVP_MD_CTX_reset(digest->ctx);
+
+ /* Determine the correct OpenSSL message digest type */
+ switch (type) {
+@@ -614,7 +617,7 @@ DIGEST *crypto_digest_new(JCR *jcr, crypto_digest_t type)
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize the backing OpenSSL context */
+- if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&digest->ctx, md, NULL) == 0) {
++ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(digest->ctx, md, NULL) == 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+@@ -635,7 +638,7 @@ DIGEST *crypto_digest_new(JCR *jcr, crypto_digest_t type)
+ */
+ bool crypto_digest_update(DIGEST *digest, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t length)
+ {
+- if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&digest->ctx, data, length) == 0) {
++ if (EVP_DigestUpdate(digest->ctx, data, length) == 0) {
+ Dmsg0(150, "digest update failed\n");
+ openssl_post_errors(digest->jcr, M_ERROR, _("OpenSSL digest update failed"));
+ return false;
+@@ -653,7 +656,7 @@ bool crypto_digest_update(DIGEST *digest, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t length)
+ */
+ bool crypto_digest_finalize(DIGEST *digest, uint8_t *dest, uint32_t *length)
+ {
+- if (!EVP_DigestFinal(&digest->ctx, dest, (unsigned int *)length)) {
++ if (!EVP_DigestFinal(digest->ctx, dest, (unsigned int *)length)) {
+ Dmsg0(150, "digest finalize failed\n");
+ openssl_post_errors(digest->jcr, M_ERROR, _("OpenSSL digest finalize failed"));
+ return false;
+@@ -667,7 +670,7 @@ bool crypto_digest_finalize(DIGEST *digest, uint8_t *dest, uint32_t *length)
+ */
+ void crypto_digest_free(DIGEST *digest)
+ {
+- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&digest->ctx);
++ EVP_MD_CTX_free(digest->ctx);
+ free(digest);
+ }
+
+@@ -790,7 +793,7 @@ crypto_error_t crypto_sign_verify(SIGNATURE *sig, X509_KEYPAIR *keypair, DIGEST
+ sigLen = M_ASN1_STRING_length(si->signature);
+ sigData = M_ASN1_STRING_data(si->signature);
+
+- ok = EVP_VerifyFinal(&digest->ctx, sigData, sigLen, keypair->pubkey);
++ ok = EVP_VerifyFinal(digest->ctx, sigData, sigLen, keypair->pubkey);
+ if (ok >= 1) {
+ return CRYPTO_ERROR_NONE;
+ } else if (ok == 0) {
+@@ -858,12 +861,12 @@ int crypto_sign_add_signer(SIGNATURE *sig, DIGEST *digest, X509_KEYPAIR *keypair
+ /* Set our signature algorithm. We currently require RSA */
+ assert(EVP_PKEY_type(keypair->pubkey->type) == EVP_PKEY_RSA);
+ /* This is slightly evil. Reach into the MD structure and grab the key type */
+- si->signatureAlgorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(digest->ctx.digest->pkey_type);
++ si->signatureAlgorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_MD_pkey_type(EVP_MD_CTX_md(digest->ctx)));
+
+ /* Finalize/Sign our Digest */
+ len = EVP_PKEY_size(keypair->privkey);
+ buf = (unsigned char *) malloc(len);
+- if (!EVP_SignFinal(&digest->ctx, buf, &len, keypair->privkey)) {
++ if (!EVP_SignFinal(digest->ctx, buf, &len, keypair->privkey)) {
+ openssl_post_errors(M_ERROR, _("Signature creation failed"));
+ goto err;
+ }
+@@ -1249,6 +1252,12 @@ CIPHER_CONTEXT *crypto_cipher_new(CRYPTO_SESSION *cs, bool encrypt, uint32_t *bl
+ const EVP_CIPHER *ec;
+
+ cipher_ctx = (CIPHER_CONTEXT *)malloc(sizeof(CIPHER_CONTEXT));
++ if (!cipher_ctx)
++ return NULL;
++
++ cipher_ctx->ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
++ if (cipher_ctx->ctx)
++ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * Acquire a cipher instance for the given ASN.1 cipher NID
+@@ -1261,40 +1270,40 @@ CIPHER_CONTEXT *crypto_cipher_new(CRYPTO_SESSION *cs, bool encrypt, uint32_t *bl
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize the OpenSSL cipher context */
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&cipher_ctx->ctx);
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(cipher_ctx->ctx);
+ if (encrypt) {
+ /* Initialize for encryption */
+- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&cipher_ctx->ctx, ec, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1)) {
++ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx->ctx, ec, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1)) {
+ openssl_post_errors(M_ERROR, _("OpenSSL cipher context initialization failed"));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Initialize for decryption */
+- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&cipher_ctx->ctx, ec, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0)) {
++ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx->ctx, ec, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0)) {
+ openssl_post_errors(M_ERROR, _("OpenSSL cipher context initialization failed"));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Set the key size */
+- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&cipher_ctx->ctx, cs->session_key_len)) {
++ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(cipher_ctx->ctx, cs->session_key_len)) {
+ openssl_post_errors(M_ERROR, _("Encryption session provided an invalid symmetric key"));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Validate the IV length */
+- if (EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(ec) != M_ASN1_STRING_length(cs->cryptoData->iv)) {
++ if (EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(ec) != ASN1_STRING_length(cs->cryptoData->iv)) {
+ openssl_post_errors(M_ERROR, _("Encryption session provided an invalid IV"));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Add the key and IV to the cipher context */
+- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&cipher_ctx->ctx, NULL, NULL, cs->session_key, M_ASN1_STRING_data(cs->cryptoData->iv), -1)) {
++ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx->ctx, NULL, NULL, cs->session_key, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(cs->cryptoData->iv), -1)) {
+ openssl_post_errors(M_ERROR, _("OpenSSL cipher context key/IV initialization failed"));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+- *blocksize = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&cipher_ctx->ctx);
++ *blocksize = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(cipher_ctx->ctx);
+ return cipher_ctx;
+
+ err:
+@@ -1310,7 +1319,7 @@ CIPHER_CONTEXT *crypto_cipher_new(CRYPTO_SESSION *cs, bool encrypt, uint32_t *bl
+ */
+ bool crypto_cipher_update(CIPHER_CONTEXT *cipher_ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t length, const uint8_t *dest, uint32_t *written)
+ {
+- if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(&cipher_ctx->ctx, (unsigned char *)dest, (int *)written, (const unsigned char *)data, length)) {
++ if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(cipher_ctx->ctx, (unsigned char *)dest, (int *)written, (const unsigned char *)data, length)) {
+ /* This really shouldn't fail */
+ return false;
+ } else {
+@@ -1328,7 +1337,7 @@ bool crypto_cipher_update(CIPHER_CONTEXT *cipher_ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint3
+ */
+ bool crypto_cipher_finalize (CIPHER_CONTEXT *cipher_ctx, uint8_t *dest, uint32_t *written)
+ {
+- if (!EVP_CipherFinal_ex(&cipher_ctx->ctx, (unsigned char *)dest, (int *) written)) {
++ if (!EVP_CipherFinal_ex(cipher_ctx->ctx, (unsigned char *)dest, (int *) written)) {
+ /* This really shouldn't fail */
+ return false;
+ } else {
+@@ -1342,12 +1351,10 @@ bool crypto_cipher_finalize (CIPHER_CONTEXT *cipher_ctx, uint8_t *dest, uint32_t
+ */
+ void crypto_cipher_free (CIPHER_CONTEXT *cipher_ctx)
+ {
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher_ctx->ctx);
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cipher_ctx->ctx);
+ free (cipher_ctx);
+ }
+
+-
+-
+ #else /* HAVE_OPENSSL */
+ # error No encryption library available
+ #endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL */
+--
+2.15.0
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/openssl1.1_0005-crypto_-convert-EVP_PKEY-access-and-remainings-bits-.patch b/debian/patches/openssl1.1_0005-crypto_-convert-EVP_PKEY-access-and-remainings-bits-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..54bc5f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/openssl1.1_0005-crypto_-convert-EVP_PKEY-access-and-remainings-bits-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+From 8e5336b18826a9057912d55f5aafb3d1e392d195 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian at breakpoint.cc>
+Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2017 21:08:10 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 5/5] crypto_: convert EVP_PKEY access and remainings bits for
+ OpenSSL 1.1
+
+EVP_PKEY became opaque and can not be dereferences in OpenSSL 1.1 and
+accessor functions need to be used. This is also true for X509_EXTENSION
+relevant access.
+
+Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian at breakpoint.cc>
+---
+ src/lib/crypto.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
+ src/lib/tls.c | 8 ++++---
+ 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/crypto.c b/src/lib/crypto.c
+index 1dae063697c7..3657c06aa8b0 100644
+--- a/src/lib/crypto.c
++++ b/src/lib/crypto.c
+@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ typedef struct PEM_CB_Context {
+
+ /*
+ * Extract subjectKeyIdentifier from x509 certificate.
+- * Returns: On success, an ASN1_OCTET_STRING that must be freed via M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free().
++ * Returns: On success, an ASN1_OCTET_STRING that must be freed via ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free().
+ * NULL on failure.
+ */
+ static ASN1_OCTET_STRING *openssl_cert_keyid(X509 *cert) {
+@@ -312,6 +312,7 @@ static ASN1_OCTET_STRING *openssl_cert_keyid(X509 *cert) {
+ const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid;
+ int i;
++ const ASN1_STRING *asn1_ext_val;
+ const unsigned char *ext_value_data;
+
+ /* Find the index to the subjectKeyIdentifier extension */
+@@ -329,19 +330,20 @@ static ASN1_OCTET_STRING *openssl_cert_keyid(X509 *cert) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+- ext_value_data = ext->value->data;
++ asn1_ext_val = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ext);
++ ext_value_data = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(asn1_ext_val);
+
+ if (method->it) {
+ /* New style ASN1 */
+
+ /* Decode ASN1 item in data */
+- keyid = (ASN1_OCTET_STRING *) ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &ext_value_data, ext->value->length,
++ keyid = (ASN1_OCTET_STRING *) ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &ext_value_data, ASN1_STRING_length(asn1_ext_val),
+ ASN1_ITEM_ptr(method->it));
+ } else {
+ /* Old style ASN1 */
+
+ /* Decode ASN1 item in data */
+- keyid = (ASN1_OCTET_STRING *) method->d2i(NULL, &ext_value_data, ext->value->length);
++ keyid = (ASN1_OCTET_STRING *) method->d2i(NULL, &ext_value_data, ASN1_STRING_length(asn1_ext_val));
+ }
+
+ return keyid;
+@@ -376,6 +378,7 @@ X509_KEYPAIR *crypto_keypair_new(void)
+ X509_KEYPAIR *crypto_keypair_dup(X509_KEYPAIR *keypair)
+ {
+ X509_KEYPAIR *newpair;
++ int ret;
+
+ newpair = crypto_keypair_new();
+
+@@ -386,27 +389,32 @@ X509_KEYPAIR *crypto_keypair_dup(X509_KEYPAIR *keypair)
+
+ /* Increment the public key ref count */
+ if (keypair->pubkey) {
+- CRYPTO_add(&(keypair->pubkey->references), 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
++ ret = EVP_PKEY_up_ref(keypair->pubkey);
++ if (ret == 0)
++ goto out_free_new;
+ newpair->pubkey = keypair->pubkey;
+ }
+
+ /* Increment the private key ref count */
+ if (keypair->privkey) {
+- CRYPTO_add(&(keypair->privkey->references), 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
++ ret = EVP_PKEY_up_ref(keypair->privkey);
++ if (ret == 0)
++ goto out_free_new;
+ newpair->privkey = keypair->privkey;
+ }
+
+ /* Duplicate the keyid */
+ if (keypair->keyid) {
+- newpair->keyid = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(keypair->keyid);
+- if (!newpair->keyid) {
+- /* Allocation failed */
+- crypto_keypair_free(newpair);
+- return NULL;
+- }
++ newpair->keyid = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(keypair->keyid);
++ if (!newpair->keyid)
++ goto out_free_new;
+ }
+
+ return newpair;
++
++out_free_new:
++ crypto_keypair_free(newpair);
++ return NULL;
+ }
+
+
+@@ -447,9 +455,9 @@ int crypto_keypair_load_cert(X509_KEYPAIR *keypair, const char *file)
+ }
+
+ /* Validate the public key type (only RSA is supported) */
+- if (EVP_PKEY_type(keypair->pubkey->type) != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
++ if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(keypair->pubkey) != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+ Jmsg1(NULL, M_ERROR, 0,
+- _("Unsupported key type provided: %d\n"), EVP_PKEY_type(keypair->pubkey->type));
++ _("Unsupported key type provided: %d\n"), EVP_PKEY_id(keypair->pubkey));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+@@ -569,7 +577,7 @@ void crypto_keypair_free(X509_KEYPAIR *keypair)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(keypair->privkey);
+ }
+ if (keypair->keyid) {
+- M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(keypair->keyid);
++ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(keypair->keyid);
+ }
+ free(keypair);
+ }
+@@ -722,7 +730,7 @@ crypto_error_t crypto_sign_get_digest(SIGNATURE *sig, X509_KEYPAIR *keypair,
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SignerInfo_num(signers); i++) {
+ si = sk_SignerInfo_value(signers, i);
+- if (M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(keypair->keyid, si->subjectKeyIdentifier) == 0) {
++ if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(keypair->keyid, si->subjectKeyIdentifier) == 0) {
+ /* Get the digest algorithm and allocate a digest context */
+ Dmsg1(150, "crypto_sign_get_digest jcr=%p\n", sig->jcr);
+ switch (OBJ_obj2nid(si->digestAlgorithm)) {
+@@ -788,10 +796,10 @@ crypto_error_t crypto_sign_verify(SIGNATURE *sig, X509_KEYPAIR *keypair, DIGEST
+ /* Find the signer */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SignerInfo_num(signers); i++) {
+ si = sk_SignerInfo_value(signers, i);
+- if (M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(keypair->keyid, si->subjectKeyIdentifier) == 0) {
++ if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(keypair->keyid, si->subjectKeyIdentifier) == 0) {
+ /* Extract the signature data */
+- sigLen = M_ASN1_STRING_length(si->signature);
+- sigData = M_ASN1_STRING_data(si->signature);
++ sigLen = ASN1_STRING_length(si->signature);
++ sigData = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(si->signature);
+
+ ok = EVP_VerifyFinal(digest->ctx, sigData, sigLen, keypair->pubkey);
+ if (ok >= 1) {
+@@ -855,11 +863,11 @@ int crypto_sign_add_signer(SIGNATURE *sig, DIGEST *digest, X509_KEYPAIR *keypair
+ }
+
+ /* Drop the string allocated by OpenSSL, and add our subjectKeyIdentifier */
+- M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(si->subjectKeyIdentifier);
+- si->subjectKeyIdentifier = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(keypair->keyid);
++ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(si->subjectKeyIdentifier);
++ si->subjectKeyIdentifier = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(keypair->keyid);
+
+ /* Set our signature algorithm. We currently require RSA */
+- assert(EVP_PKEY_type(keypair->pubkey->type) == EVP_PKEY_RSA);
++ assert(EVP_PKEY_base_id(keypair->pubkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA);
+ /* This is slightly evil. Reach into the MD structure and grab the key type */
+ si->signatureAlgorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_MD_pkey_type(EVP_MD_CTX_md(digest->ctx)));
+
+@@ -872,7 +880,7 @@ int crypto_sign_add_signer(SIGNATURE *sig, DIGEST *digest, X509_KEYPAIR *keypair
+ }
+
+ /* Add the signature to the SignerInfo structure */
+- if (!M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(si->signature, buf, len)) {
++ if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(si->signature, buf, len)) {
+ /* Allocation failed in OpenSSL */
+ goto err;
+ }
+@@ -1045,7 +1053,7 @@ CRYPTO_SESSION *crypto_session_new (crypto_cipher_t cipher, alist *pubkeys)
+ }
+
+ /* Store it in our ASN.1 structure */
+- if (!M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(cs->cryptoData->iv, iv, iv_len)) {
++ if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(cs->cryptoData->iv, iv, iv_len)) {
+ /* Allocation failed in OpenSSL */
+ crypto_session_free(cs);
+ free(iv);
+@@ -1074,11 +1082,11 @@ CRYPTO_SESSION *crypto_session_new (crypto_cipher_t cipher, alist *pubkeys)
+ ASN1_INTEGER_set(ri->version, BACULA_ASN1_VERSION);
+
+ /* Drop the string allocated by OpenSSL, and add our subjectKeyIdentifier */
+- M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ri->subjectKeyIdentifier);
+- ri->subjectKeyIdentifier = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(keypair->keyid);
++ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ri->subjectKeyIdentifier);
++ ri->subjectKeyIdentifier = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(keypair->keyid);
+
+ /* Set our key encryption algorithm. We currently require RSA */
+- assert(keypair->pubkey && EVP_PKEY_type(keypair->pubkey->type) == EVP_PKEY_RSA);
++ assert(keypair->pubkey && EVP_PKEY_base_id(keypair->pubkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA);
+ ri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption);
+
+ /* Encrypt the session key */
+@@ -1093,7 +1101,7 @@ CRYPTO_SESSION *crypto_session_new (crypto_cipher_t cipher, alist *pubkeys)
+ }
+
+ /* Store it in our ASN.1 structure */
+- if (!M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ri->encryptedKey, ekey, ekey_len)) {
++ if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ri->encryptedKey, ekey, ekey_len)) {
+ /* Allocation failed in OpenSSL */
+ RecipientInfo_free(ri);
+ crypto_session_free(cs);
+@@ -1187,11 +1195,11 @@ crypto_error_t crypto_session_decode(const uint8_t *data, uint32_t length, alist
+ ri = sk_RecipientInfo_value(recipients, i);
+
+ /* Match against the subjectKeyIdentifier */
+- if (M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(keypair->keyid, ri->subjectKeyIdentifier) == 0) {
++ if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(keypair->keyid, ri->subjectKeyIdentifier) == 0) {
+ /* Match found, extract symmetric encryption session data */
+
+ /* RSA is required. */
+- assert(EVP_PKEY_type(keypair->privkey->type) == EVP_PKEY_RSA);
++ assert(EVP_PKEY_base_id(keypair->privkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA);
+
+ /* If we recieve a RecipientInfo structure that does not use
+ * RSA, return an error */
+@@ -1203,8 +1211,8 @@ crypto_error_t crypto_session_decode(const uint8_t *data, uint32_t length, alist
+ /* Decrypt the session key */
+ /* Allocate sufficient space for the largest possible decrypted data */
+ cs->session_key = (unsigned char *)malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(keypair->privkey));
+- cs->session_key_len = EVP_PKEY_decrypt(cs->session_key, M_ASN1_STRING_data(ri->encryptedKey),
+- M_ASN1_STRING_length(ri->encryptedKey), keypair->privkey);
++ cs->session_key_len = EVP_PKEY_decrypt(cs->session_key, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(ri->encryptedKey),
++ ASN1_STRING_length(ri->encryptedKey), keypair->privkey);
+
+ if (cs->session_key_len <= 0) {
+ openssl_post_errors(M_ERROR, _("Failure decrypting the session key"));
+diff --git a/src/lib/tls.c b/src/lib/tls.c
+index c71a4ad525fe..01d3f94e8113 100644
+--- a/src/lib/tls.c
++++ b/src/lib/tls.c
+@@ -337,25 +337,27 @@ bool tls_postconnect_verify_host(JCR *jcr, TLS_CONNECTION *tls, const char *host
+ CONF_VALUE *nval;
+ void *extstr = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *ext_value_data;
++ const ASN1_STRING *asn1_ext_val;
+
+ /* Get x509 extension method structure */
+ if (!(method = X509V3_EXT_get(ext))) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+- ext_value_data = ext->value->data;
++ asn1_ext_val = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ext);
++ ext_value_data = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(asn1_ext_val);
+
+ if (method->it) {
+ /* New style ASN1 */
+
+ /* Decode ASN1 item in data */
+- extstr = ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &ext_value_data, ext->value->length,
++ extstr = ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &ext_value_data, ASN1_STRING_length(asn1_ext_val),
+ ASN1_ITEM_ptr(method->it));
+ } else {
+ /* Old style ASN1 */
+
+ /* Decode ASN1 item in data */
+- extstr = method->d2i(NULL, &ext_value_data, ext->value->length);
++ extstr = method->d2i(NULL, &ext_value_data, ASN1_STRING_length(asn1_ext_val));
+ }
+
+ /* Iterate through to find the dNSName field(s) */
+--
+2.15.0
+
--
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