[Pkg-cups-devel] Bug#692791: running cupsd as root

[Yves-Alexis Perez]

On dim., 2012-11-11 at 17:53 +0100, Didier 'OdyX' Raboud wrote:
> Hi Michael,
> 
> Le dimanche, 11 novembre 2012 14.57:05, Michael Sweet a écrit :
> > Lest we forget why we run cupsd as root, here are a few reasons:
> > (…)
> 
> Thanks for the explanation.
> 
> > As for a proposed fix, I'm thinking we will disable the log file,
> > RequestRoot, ServerRoot, and DocumentRoot directives in cupsd.conf, and
> > add command line arguments in their place. That will retain
> > configurability while eliminating this particular attack vector.
> > 
> > Thoughts?
> 
> I don't quite like the "command-line arguments" solution, as it will probably 
> lead to more machinery on our side (variable setting in /etc/default/cups , 
> sourcing it from /etc/init.d/cups, etc).
> 
> What about separating the configuration settings in two configuration files, 
> one modifiable from the webinterface, and one only modifiable by root ? The 
> first would contain the non-sensitive configuration settings, the latter would 
> contain the paths, file definitions, etc. I would tend to prefer to keep 
> configuration settings in configuration files. (But of course we'll cope with 
> the upstream choice. :-) )
> 

Any news on this?

-- 
Yves-Alexis Perez
 Debian Security
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