Bug#697125: iceweasel: default value for extensions.blocklist.enabled causes Iceweasel to phone home

Francesco Poli invernomuto at paranoici.org
Wed Jan 2 18:10:17 UTC 2013


On Wed, 2 Jan 2013 08:25:21 +0100 Mike Hommey wrote:

[...]
> On Tue, Jan 01, 2013 at 05:03:35PM +0100, Francesco Poli (wintermute) wrote:
[...]
> > It seems that Firefox sends a bunch of user data (including IP address,
> > used browser version, browser usage times, number of users and list
> > of enabled extensions) to a Mozilla-Foundation-controlled server.
> > Daily!
> 
> No list of extensions is sent.

Mike, first of all thanks a lot for your prompt response.
That's really appreciated, indeed.

The fact that no list of extensions is sent is a (partial) relief,
thanks for clarifying.

> 
> > It seems that this is used to disable extensions which are deemed to
> > be "dangerous" by Mozilla. But I think that this poses at least two issues:
> > 
> >  * the user should not be silently induced to trust Mozilla on which
> >    extensions are OK and which are "dangerous"
> 
> They should be instead lured into installing malware.

Please don't take offense: I have no special reason to think that
Mozilla Corporation is doing anything nasty with the few data which are
silently sent to them.
I am implying nothing of the kind.
I apologize, if I was not clear enough on this.

It's just that, being a bit paranoid, I am always suspicious about
programs that phone home.

And I think that Debian users should *not* be forced to trust Mozilla
Corporation without even being informed about this "feature"...

> 
> >  * the data sent to Mozilla seem to be unnecessarily detailed and thus
> >    are a privacy issue (after all, the same purpose could be achieved
> >    by _downloading_ a list of "dangerous" extensions from Mozilla,
> >    without _sending_ any data to them!)
> 
> That's actually what happens, a list of blocked addons is downloaded.

This is less creepy than depicted, then.
Thanks again for clarifying.

> No list of extensions is sent to Mozilla. The only information sent is:
> - APP_ID
> - APP_VERSION
> - PRODUCT
> - BUILD_ID
> - BUILD_TARGET
> - OS_VERSION
> - LOCALE
> - CHANNEL
> - DISTRIBUTION
> - DISTRIBUTION_VERSION
> - PING_COUNT
> - TOTAL_PING_COUNT
> - DAYS_SINCE_LAST_PING
> 
> Only the first two are strictly required.

Well, then I wonder why the other information is sent at all...

[...]
> I'm not very much concerned by this kind of data being sent by default,
> first, because it doesn't expose much of anything,

I am under the impression that some partial info about usage habits
may be inferred by the three *PING* values.

[...]
> and second, because
> the server-side code is also open-source.
> 
> https://github.com/mozilla/zamboni/blob/master/lib/urls_base.py#L24
> https://github.com/mozilla/zamboni/blob/master/apps/blocklist/views.py

That's true, but, once again, users must trust Mozilla Corporation
that the publicly known server-side code is actually what is being
run by the Mozilla-controlled server.

I guess it actually is, I have no special reason to think that Mozilla
Corporation is telling lies, but, nonetheless... believing this
requires trusting Mozilla Corporation, something that not all Debian
users are necessarily comfortable with...

> 
> > Hence, I am convinced that this feature should be disabled by default
> > in Debian's Iceweasel, unless the user explicitly re-enables it.
> 
> Hence, I am not convinced this feature should be disabled by default,
> especially since this is a useful malware protection (and yes, it's
> pretty easy to encounter such malware, there have been some spreading
> through facebook a few months ago, for instance).

I personally try as much as possible to avoid installing extensions
from within Iceweasel for my regular user: I strongly prefer to install
packaged extensions for the entire system through aptitude.
But I acknowledge that several users will sure install extensions
from within Iceweasel.

Hence, I am *not* saying that this may not be a useful malware protection.
Indeed it may be.
But users must trust Mozilla Corporation that it will not be abused for
nasty purposes.

That's why I think it should not be *silently* enabled by default
and buried in some obscure about:config setting.

I hope I clarified my opinion.
Thanks for understanding.


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