[pkg-wine-party] Bug#733556: Ok I think someone has this issue backwards.

[Jakub Wilk]

* Peter Dolding <oiaohm at gmail.com>, 2014-03-04, 13:11:
>wine should not be run as root. There is no wrapper on binfmt_misc to 
>make it fail in case of a .exe on root.

Why should such a protection be implemented in the wrapped rather than 
in wine itself?

>Reason why wine should not run as root. Wine can run Windows viruses 
>very effectively.

Huh. /bin/sh can run Linux malware very effectively. Does it mean that 
we shouldn't let users run #!/bin/sh scripts as root?!

>Number 2 WINEPREFIX settings. Direct running by binfmt_misc cannot 
>tell that X application in fact owns to alternative WINEPREFIX. Wine 
>does not use extended Xattr to declare WINEPREFIX ownership on .exe 
>files.

No idea what you're talking about here.

>Really I would like to hear the real-world examples that require this 
>feature.

Like Mathieu, I've been using this feature to ease cross-compiling.

>Basically the broken state is a good time to patch up a security issue.

Please explain why do you think that this is a security issue:
	./foo.exe
but this is not:
	wine foo.exe


Anyway, if Debian wine maintainers decide that this feature is no longer 
desirable, then:
1) It should be documented in NEWS.Debian;
2) The /usr/bin/wine-auto interpreter should be properly removed from 
the binfmt-support database.

-- 
Jakub Wilk