[pkg-wpa-devel] r1958 - in /wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-1: ./ 0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch

[slh-guest at users.alioth.debian.org]

Author: slh-guest
Date: Mon Nov 23 00:35:22 2015
New Revision: 1958

URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-wpa/?sc=1&rev=1958
Log:
really add new directory

Added:
    wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-1/
    wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-1/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch

Added: wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-1/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-wpa/wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-1/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch?rev=1958&op=file
==============================================================================
--- wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-1/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch	(added)
+++ wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-1/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch	Mon Nov 23 00:35:22 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 9ed4eee345f85e3025c33c6e20aa25696e341ccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni at qca.qualcomm.com>
+Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2015 11:32:11 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it
+ (CVE-2015-1863)
+
+This fixes a possible memcpy overflow for P2P dev->oper_ssid in
+p2p_add_device(). The length provided by the peer device (0..255 bytes)
+was used without proper bounds checking and that could have resulted in
+arbitrary data of up to 223 bytes being written beyond the end of the
+dev->oper_ssid[] array (of which about 150 bytes would be beyond the
+heap allocation) when processing a corrupted management frame for P2P
+peer discovery purposes.
+
+This could result in corrupted state in heap, unexpected program
+behavior due to corrupted P2P peer device information, denial of service
+due to process crash, exposure of memory contents during GO Negotiation,
+and potentially arbitrary code execution.
+
+Thanks to Google security team for reporting this issue and smart
+hardware research group of Alibaba security team for discovering it.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni at qca.qualcomm.com>
+---
+ src/p2p/p2p.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/src/p2p/p2p.c
++++ b/src/p2p/p2p.c
+@@ -736,6 +736,7 @@ int p2p_add_device(struct p2p_data *p2p,
+ 	if (os_memcmp(addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0)
+ 		os_memcpy(dev->interface_addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
+ 	if (msg.ssid &&
++	    msg.ssid[1] <= sizeof(dev->oper_ssid) &&
+ 	    (msg.ssid[1] != P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN ||
+ 	     os_memcmp(msg.ssid + 2, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN)
+ 	     != 0)) {