[pkg-wpa-devel] r1957 - in /wpa/trunk/debian: ./ patches/ patches/2015-01/ patches/2015-02/ patches/2015-03/ patches/2015-04/ patches/2015-05/ patches/2015-2/ patches/2015-3/ patches/2015-4/ patches/2015-5/ patches/2015-6/ patches/2015-7/ patches/2015-8/
slh-guest at users.alioth.debian.org
slh-guest at users.alioth.debian.org
Mon Nov 23 00:35:04 UTC 2015
Author: slh-guest
Date: Mon Nov 23 00:35:04 2015
New Revision: 1957
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-wpa/?sc=1&rev=1957
Log:
* NOT RELEASED YET
debian/patches/2015-1/.
* import NMU changelogs and integrate NMU changes.
* Non-maintainer upload.
* Add patch to address CVE-2015-5310.
CVE-2015-5310: wpa_supplicant unauthorized WNM Sleep Mode GTK control.
(Closes: #804707)
* Add patches to address CVE-2015-5314 and CVE-2015-5315.
CVE-2015-5314: hostapd: EAP-pwd missing last fragment length validation.
CVE-2015-5315: wpa_supplicant: EAP-pwd missing last fragment length
validation. (Closes: #804708)
* Add patch to address CVE-2015-5316.
CVE-2015-5316: EAP-pwd peer error path failure on unexpected Confirm
message. (Closes: #804710)
* Non-maintainer upload.
* Add patch to address CVE-2015-4141.
CVE-2015-4141: WPS UPnP vulnerability with HTTP chunked transfer
encoding. (Closes: #787372)
* Add patch to address CVE-2015-4142.
CVE-2015-4142: Integer underflow in AP mode WMM Action frame processing.
(Closes: #787373)
* Add patches to address CVE-2015-414{3,4,5,6}
CVE-2015-4143 CVE-2015-4144 CVE-2015-4145 CVE-2015-4146: EAP-pwd missing
payload length validation. (Closes: #787371)
* Add patch to address 2015-5 vulnerability.
NFC: Fix payload length validation in NDEF record parser (Closes: #795740)
* Thanks to Julian Wollrath <jwollrath at web.de> for the initial debdiff
provided in #787371.
* Non-maintainer upload.
* Import four patches from upstream git (wpasupplicant_band_selection_*.patch),
manually unfuzzed, to improve 2.4/5 GHz band selection. (Closes: #795722)
Added:
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-2/
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-2/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-3/
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-3/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-5/
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-5/0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-6/
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-6/backported-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame.patch
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-7/
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-7/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-7/0001-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-8/
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-8/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m.patch
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/wpasupplicant_band_selection_8b2b718d.patch
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/wpasupplicant_band_selection_a1b790eb.patch
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/wpasupplicant_band_selection_aa517ae2.patch
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/wpasupplicant_band_selection_f0d0a5d2.patch
Removed:
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-01/
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-02/
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-03/
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-04/
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-05/
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/fix-minor-issue-in-HT40-max-rate-determination.patch
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/improve-BSS-selection-with-default-noise-floor-value.patch
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/select-AP-based-on-estimated-maximum-throughput.patch
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/wpa_supplicant-Fix-a-typo-in-wpa_scan_result_compar.patch
Modified:
wpa/trunk/debian/changelog
wpa/trunk/debian/patches/series
wpa/trunk/debian/rules
Modified: wpa/trunk/debian/changelog
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-wpa/wpa/trunk/debian/changelog?rev=1957&op=diff
==============================================================================
--- wpa/trunk/debian/changelog (original)
+++ wpa/trunk/debian/changelog Mon Nov 23 00:35:04 2015
@@ -1,33 +1,11 @@
-wpa (2.3-3) unstable; urgency=medium
-
+wpa (2.3-4) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
+
+ * NOT RELEASED YET
* wpasupplicant: install systemd unit (Closes: #766746).
* wpasupplicant: configure driver fallback for networkd.
* import changelogs from the security queues.
- * import upstream security fixes for wpa:
- - WPS UPnP vulnerability with HTTP chunked transfer encoding (2015-2,
- CVE-2015-4141, Closes: #787372).
- + WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser
- - Integer underflow in AP mode WMM Action frame processing (2015-3,
- CVE-2015-4142, Closes: #787373)
- + AP WMM: Fix integer underflow in WMM Action frame parser
- - EAP-pwd missing payload length validation (2015-4, CVE-2015-4143,
- CVE-2015-4144, CVE-2015-4145, CVE-2015-4146, Closes: 787371).
- + EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit and Confirm
- + EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit and Confirm
- + EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment reassembly
- + EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment reassembly
- + EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior
- - Incomplete WPS and P2P NFC NDEF record payload length validation (2015-5,
- no CVE yet)
- + NFC: Fix payload length validation in NDEF record parser
* move previous patch for CVE-2015-1863 into a new subdirectory,
- debian/patches/2015-1/ and add the upstream advisory.
- * backport band selection patches from upstream, thanks to Steinar H.
- Gunderson <sgunderson at bigfoot.com> (Closes: #795722):
- - Improve BSS selection with default noise floor values.
- - Select AP based on estimated maximum throughput
- - Fix minor issue in HT40 max rate determination
- - wpa_supplicant: Fix a typo in wpa_scan_result_compar()
+ debian/patches/2015-1/.
* replace the Debian specific patch "wpasupplicant: fix systemd unit
dependencies" with a backport of its official upstream change "systemd:
Order wpa_supplicant before network.target".
@@ -36,8 +14,52 @@
wireless links which are still holding open NFS shares. Thanks to Facundo
Gaich <facugaich at gmail.com> and Michael Biebl <biebl at debian.org>
(Closes: #785579).
+ * import NMU changelogs and integrate NMU changes.
-- Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h at gmx.de> Wed, 19 Aug 2015 03:00:19 +0200
+
+wpa (2.3-2.3) unstable; urgency=high
+
+ * Non-maintainer upload.
+ * Add patch to address CVE-2015-5310.
+ CVE-2015-5310: wpa_supplicant unauthorized WNM Sleep Mode GTK control.
+ (Closes: #804707)
+ * Add patches to address CVE-2015-5314 and CVE-2015-5315.
+ CVE-2015-5314: hostapd: EAP-pwd missing last fragment length validation.
+ CVE-2015-5315: wpa_supplicant: EAP-pwd missing last fragment length
+ validation. (Closes: #804708)
+ * Add patch to address CVE-2015-5316.
+ CVE-2015-5316: EAP-pwd peer error path failure on unexpected Confirm
+ message. (Closes: #804710)
+
+ -- Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil at debian.org> Thu, 12 Nov 2015 20:54:12 +0100
+
+wpa (2.3-2.2) unstable; urgency=high
+
+ * Non-maintainer upload.
+ * Add patch to address CVE-2015-4141.
+ CVE-2015-4141: WPS UPnP vulnerability with HTTP chunked transfer
+ encoding. (Closes: #787372)
+ * Add patch to address CVE-2015-4142.
+ CVE-2015-4142: Integer underflow in AP mode WMM Action frame processing.
+ (Closes: #787373)
+ * Add patches to address CVE-2015-414{3,4,5,6}
+ CVE-2015-4143 CVE-2015-4144 CVE-2015-4145 CVE-2015-4146: EAP-pwd missing
+ payload length validation. (Closes: #787371)
+ * Add patch to address 2015-5 vulnerability.
+ NFC: Fix payload length validation in NDEF record parser (Closes: #795740)
+ * Thanks to Julian Wollrath <jwollrath at web.de> for the initial debdiff
+ provided in #787371.
+
+ -- Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil at debian.org> Sat, 31 Oct 2015 14:13:50 +0100
+
+wpa (2.3-2.1) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+ * Non-maintainer upload.
+ * Import four patches from upstream git (wpasupplicant_band_selection_*.patch),
+ manually unfuzzed, to improve 2.4/5 GHz band selection. (Closes: #795722)
+
+ -- Steinar H. Gunderson <sesse at debian.org> Sun, 30 Aug 2015 14:47:56 +0200
wpa (2.3-2) unstable; urgency=high
Added: wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-2/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-wpa/wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-2/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch?rev=1957&op=file
==============================================================================
--- wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-2/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch (added)
+++ wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-2/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch Mon Nov 23 00:35:04 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser
+
+strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and
+resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could
+result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length
+argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault.
+
+This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that
+has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This
+would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with
+upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER
+(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used).
+
+Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to
+rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be
+larger than the maximum configured body length.
+
+Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
+reporting this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+---
+ src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/src/wps/httpread.c
++++ b/src/wps/httpread.c
+@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd
+ if (!isxdigit(*cbp))
+ goto bad;
+ h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16);
++ if (h->chunk_size < 0 ||
++ h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++ "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d",
++ h->chunk_size);
++ goto bad;
++ }
+ /* throw away chunk header
+ * so we have only real data
+ */
Added: wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-3/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-wpa/wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-3/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch?rev=1957&op=file
==============================================================================
--- wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-3/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch (added)
+++ wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-3/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch Mon Nov 23 00:35:04 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From ef566a4d4f74022e1fdb0a2addfe81e6de9f4aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 02:21:53 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] AP WMM: Fix integer underflow in WMM Action frame parser
+
+The length of the WMM Action frame was not properly validated and the
+length of the information elements (int left) could end up being
+negative. This would result in reading significantly past the stack
+buffer while parsing the IEs in ieee802_11_parse_elems() and while doing
+so, resulting in segmentation fault.
+
+This can result in an invalid frame being used for a denial of service
+attack (hostapd process killed) against an AP with a driver that uses
+hostapd for management frame processing (e.g., all mac80211-based
+drivers).
+
+Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
+reporting this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+---
+ src/ap/wmm.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/src/ap/wmm.c
++++ b/src/ap/wmm.c
+@@ -274,6 +274,9 @@ void hostapd_wmm_action(struct hostapd_d
+ return;
+ }
+
++ if (left < 0)
++ return; /* not a valid WMM Action frame */
++
+ /* extract the tspec info element */
+ if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos, left, &elems, 1) == ParseFailed) {
+ hostapd_logger(hapd, mgmt->sa, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211,
Added: wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-wpa/wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch?rev=1957&op=file
==============================================================================
--- wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch (added)
+++ wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch Mon Nov 23 00:35:04 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+From dd2f043c9c43d156494e33d7ce22db96e6ef42c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:37:45 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 1/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit
+ and Confirm
+
+The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
+checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
+overflow when processing an invalid message.
+
+Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
+processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
+make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
+message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
+
+Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
+reporting this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+@@ -301,6 +301,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct e
+ BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
+ u16 offset;
+ u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;
++ size_t prime_len, order_len;
++
++ if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) {
++ ret->ignore = TRUE;
++ goto fin;
++ }
++
++ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
++ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
++
++ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
++ (unsigned int) payload_len,
++ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
++ goto fin;
++ }
+
+ if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+ ((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
+@@ -500,6 +517,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct
+ u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
+ int offset;
+
++ if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) {
++ ret->ignore = TRUE;
++ goto fin;
++ }
++
++ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
++ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
++ goto fin;
++ }
++
+ /*
+ * first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function |
+ * prf
Added: wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-wpa/wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch?rev=1957&op=file
==============================================================================
--- wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch (added)
+++ wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch Mon Nov 23 00:35:04 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From e28a58be26184c2a23f80b410e0997ef1bd5d578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:40:44 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 2/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit
+ and Confirm
+
+The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
+checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
+overflow when processing an invalid message.
+
+Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
+processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
+make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
+message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
+
+Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
+reporting this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+@@ -634,9 +634,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_s
+ BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
+ int res = 0;
++ size_t prime_len, order_len;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response");
+
++ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
++ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
++
++ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
++ (unsigned int) payload_len,
++ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
++ goto fin;
++ }
++
+ if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+ ((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+ ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
+@@ -752,6 +764,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_
+ u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
+ int offset;
+
++ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
++ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
++ goto fin;
++ }
++
+ /* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */
+ grp = htons(data->group_num);
+ ptr = (u8 *) &cs;
Added: wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-wpa/wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch?rev=1957&op=file
==============================================================================
--- wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch (added)
+++ wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch Mon Nov 23 00:35:04 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 477c74395acd0123340457ba6f15ab345d42016e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:23:04 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 3/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
+ reassembly
+
+The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
+Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
+prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
+have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
+as a huge positive integer.
+
+In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
+before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
+potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+@@ -812,11 +812,23 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void
+ * if it's the first fragment there'll be a length field
+ */
+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
++ if (len < 2) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
++ ret->ignore = TRUE;
++ return NULL;
++ }
+ tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments whose "
+ "total length = %d", tot_len);
+ if (tot_len > 15000)
+ return NULL;
++ if (data->inbuf) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
++ ret->ignore = TRUE;
++ return NULL;
++ }
+ data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
+ if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Out of memory to buffer "
Added: wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-wpa/wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch?rev=1957&op=file
==============================================================================
--- wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch (added)
+++ wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch Mon Nov 23 00:35:04 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 3035cc2894e08319b905bd6561e8bddc8c2db9fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:06 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 4/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
+ reassembly
+
+The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
+Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
+prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
+have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
+as a huge positive integer.
+
+In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
+before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
+potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+@@ -920,11 +920,21 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_s
+ * the first fragment has a total length
+ */
+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
++ if (len < 2) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
++ return;
++ }
+ tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments, total "
+ "length = %d", tot_len);
+ if (tot_len > 15000)
+ return;
++ if (data->inbuf) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
++ return;
++ }
+ data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
+ if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Out of memory to "
Added: wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-wpa/wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch?rev=1957&op=file
==============================================================================
--- wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch (added)
+++ wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-4/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch Mon Nov 23 00:35:04 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From 28a069a545b06b99eb55ad53f63f2c99e65a98f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:28 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 5/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior
+
+The L (Length) and M (More) flags needs to be cleared before deciding
+whether the locally generated response requires fragmentation. This
+fixes an issue where these flags from the server could have been invalid
+for the following message. In some cases, this could have resulted in
+triggering the wpabuf security check that would terminate the process
+due to invalid buffer allocation.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+@@ -914,6 +914,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void
+ /*
+ * we have output! Do we need to fragment it?
+ */
++ lm_exch = EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(lm_exch);
+ len = wpabuf_len(data->outbuf);
+ if ((len + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE) > data->mtu) {
+ resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, data->mtu,
Added: wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-5/0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-wpa/wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-5/0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch?rev=1957&op=file
==============================================================================
--- wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-5/0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch (added)
+++ wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-5/0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch Mon Nov 23 00:35:04 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From df9079e72760ceb7ebe7fb11538200c516bdd886 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 21:57:28 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] NFC: Fix payload length validation in NDEF record parser
+
+It was possible for the 32-bit record->total_length value to end up
+wrapping around due to integer overflow if the longer form of payload
+length field is used and record->payload_length gets a value close to
+2^32. This could result in ndef_parse_record() accepting a too large
+payload length value and the record type filter reading up to about 20
+bytes beyond the end of the buffer and potentially killing the process.
+This could also result in an attempt to allocate close to 2^32 bytes of
+heap memory and if that were to succeed, a buffer read overflow of the
+same length which would most likely result in the process termination.
+In case of record->total_length ending up getting the value 0, there
+would be no buffer read overflow, but record parsing would result in an
+infinite loop in ndef_parse_records().
+
+Any of these error cases could potentially be used for denial of service
+attacks over NFC by using a malformed NDEF record on an NFC Tag or
+sending them during NFC connection handover if the application providing
+the NDEF message to hostapd/wpa_supplicant did no validation of the
+received records. While such validation is likely done in the NFC stack
+that needs to parse the NFC messages before further processing,
+hostapd/wpa_supplicant better be prepared for any data being included
+here.
+
+Fix this by validating record->payload_length value in a way that
+detects integer overflow. (CID 122668)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+---
+ src/wps/ndef.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/src/wps/ndef.c
++++ b/src/wps/ndef.c
+@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *d
+ if (size < 6)
+ return -1;
+ record->payload_length = ntohl(*(u32 *)pos);
++ if (record->payload_length > size - 6)
++ return -1;
+ pos += sizeof(u32);
+ }
+
+@@ -68,7 +70,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *d
+ pos += record->payload_length;
+
+ record->total_length = pos - data;
+- if (record->total_length > size)
++ if (record->total_length > size ||
++ record->total_length < record->payload_length)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+ }
Added: wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-6/backported-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame.patch
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-wpa/wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-6/backported-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame.patch?rev=1957&op=file
==============================================================================
--- wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-6/backported-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame.patch (added)
+++ wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-6/backported-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame.patch Mon Nov 23 00:35:04 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From 6b12d93d2c7428a34bfd4b3813ba339ed57b698a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2015 15:45:50 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM Sleep Mode Response frame if no
+ PMF in use
+
+WNM Sleep Mode Response frame is used to update GTK/IGTK only if PMF is
+enabled. Verify that PMF is in use before using this field on station
+side to avoid accepting unauthenticated key updates. (CVE-2015-5310)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+---
+ wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
+@@ -186,6 +186,12 @@ static void wnm_sleep_mode_exit_success(
+ end = ptr + key_len_total;
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Key Data", ptr, key_len_total);
+
++ if (key_len_total && !wpa_sm_pmf_enabled(wpa_s->wpa)) {
++ wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO,
++ "WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM-Sleep Mode Response - PMF not enabled");
++ return;
++ }
++
+ while (ptr + 1 < end) {
+ if (ptr + 2 + ptr[1] > end) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Invalid Key Data element "
Added: wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-7/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-wpa/wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-7/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch?rev=1957&op=file
==============================================================================
--- wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-7/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch (added)
+++ wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-7/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch Mon Nov 23 00:35:04 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From 8057821706784608b828e769ccefbced95591e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:18:17 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix last fragment length validation
+
+All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining
+room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last
+fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer.
+The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual
+buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process
+termination. (CVE-2015-5315)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 7 +++----
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+@@ -841,7 +841,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void
+ /*
+ * buffer and ACK the fragment
+ */
+- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
++ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
+ data->in_frag_pos += len;
+ if (data->in_frag_pos > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow attack "
+@@ -854,7 +854,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
+-
++ }
++ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
+ resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD,
+ EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE,
+ EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, eap_get_id(reqData));
+@@ -868,10 +869,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void
+ * we're buffering and this is the last fragment
+ */
+ if (data->in_frag_pos) {
+- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
+ (int) len);
+- data->in_frag_pos += len;
+ pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
+ len = data->in_frag_pos;
+ }
Added: wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-7/0001-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-wpa/wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-7/0001-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch?rev=1957&op=file
==============================================================================
--- wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-7/0001-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch (added)
+++ wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-7/0001-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch Mon Nov 23 00:35:04 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From bef802ece03f9ae9d52a21f0cf4f1bc2c5a1f8aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:24:16 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd server: Fix last fragment length validation
+
+All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining
+room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last
+fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer.
+The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual
+buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process
+termination. (CVE-2015-5314)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_s
+ /*
+ * the first and all intermediate fragments have the M bit set
+ */
+- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
++ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
+ if ((data->in_frag_pos + len) > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow "
+ "attack detected! (%d+%d > %d)",
+@@ -958,6 +958,8 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_s
+ }
+ wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
+ data->in_frag_pos += len;
++ }
++ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Got a %d byte fragment",
+ (int) len);
+ return;
+@@ -967,8 +969,6 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_s
+ * buffering fragments so that's how we know it's the last)
+ */
+ if (data->in_frag_pos) {
+- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
+- data->in_frag_pos += len;
+ pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
+ len = data->in_frag_pos;
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
Added: wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-8/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m.patch
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-wpa/wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-8/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m.patch?rev=1957&op=file
==============================================================================
--- wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-8/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m.patch (added)
+++ wpa/trunk/debian/patches/2015-8/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m.patch Mon Nov 23 00:35:04 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From 95577884ca4fa76be91344ff7a8d5d1e6dc3da61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 19:35:44 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix error path for unexpected Confirm message
+
+If the Confirm message is received from the server before the Identity
+exchange has been completed, the group has not yet been determined and
+data->grp is NULL. The error path in eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange()
+did not take this corner case into account and could end up
+dereferencing a NULL pointer and terminating the process if invalid
+message sequence is received. (CVE-2015-5316)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+@@ -713,7 +713,8 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct
+ wpabuf_put_data(data->outbuf, conf, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
+
+ fin:
+- bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
++ if (data->grp)
++ bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
+ BN_clear_free(x);
+ BN_clear_free(y);
+ if (data->outbuf == NULL) {
Modified: wpa/trunk/debian/patches/series
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-wpa/wpa/trunk/debian/patches/series?rev=1957&op=diff
==============================================================================
--- wpa/trunk/debian/patches/series (original)
+++ wpa/trunk/debian/patches/series Mon Nov 23 00:35:04 2015
@@ -7,19 +7,23 @@
wpa_supplicant-MACsec-fix-build-failure-for-IEEE8021.patch
include-ieee802_11_common.c-in-wpa_supplicant-build-.patch
hostapd_fix-hostapd-operation-without-hw_mode-driver-data.patch
-2015-01/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch
-2015-02/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
-2015-03/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
-2015-04/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
-2015-04/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
-2015-04/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
-2015-04/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
-2015-04/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
-2015-05/0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch
-improve-BSS-selection-with-default-noise-floor-value.patch
-select-AP-based-on-estimated-maximum-throughput.patch
-fix-minor-issue-in-HT40-max-rate-determination.patch
-wpa_supplicant-Fix-a-typo-in-wpa_scan_result_compar.patch
+wpasupplicant_band_selection_f0d0a5d2.patch
+wpasupplicant_band_selection_a1b790eb.patch
+wpasupplicant_band_selection_8b2b718d.patch
+wpasupplicant_band_selection_aa517ae2.patch
+2015-1/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch
+2015-2/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
+2015-3/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
+2015-4/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
+2015-4/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
+2015-4/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
+2015-4/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
+2015-4/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
+2015-5/0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch
+2015-6/backported-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame.patch
+2015-7/0001-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
+2015-7/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch
+2015-8/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m.patch
systemd_order-wpa_supplicant-before-network.target.patch
networkd-driver-fallback.patch
wpa_supplicant_fix-dependency-odering-when-invoked-with-dbus.patch
Added: wpa/trunk/debian/patches/wpasupplicant_band_selection_8b2b718d.patch
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-wpa/wpa/trunk/debian/patches/wpasupplicant_band_selection_8b2b718d.patch?rev=1957&op=file
==============================================================================
--- wpa/trunk/debian/patches/wpasupplicant_band_selection_8b2b718d.patch (added)
+++ wpa/trunk/debian/patches/wpasupplicant_band_selection_8b2b718d.patch Mon Nov 23 00:35:04 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+commit 8b2b718da9884d66684befe99d1fbdd9abe5fb5e
+Author: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+Date: Sat Feb 28 16:35:07 2015 +0200
+
+ Fix minor issue in HT40 max rate determination
+
+ Commit a1b790eb9d7514d1a6e0582a07f695a1564caa59 ('Select AP based on
+ estimated maximum throughput') had a copy-paste bug than ended up
+ leaving one of the max_ht40_rate() cases unreachable. (CID 106087)
+
+ Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/scan.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/scan.c
+@@ -1810,7 +1810,7 @@ static unsigned int max_ht40_rate(int sn
+ return 81000; /* HT40 MCS4 */
+ if (snr < 22)
+ return 108000; /* HT40 MCS5 */
+- if (snr < 22)
++ if (snr < 24)
+ return 121500; /* HT40 MCS6 */
+ return 135000; /* HT40 MCS7 */
+ }
Added: wpa/trunk/debian/patches/wpasupplicant_band_selection_a1b790eb.patch
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-wpa/wpa/trunk/debian/patches/wpasupplicant_band_selection_a1b790eb.patch?rev=1957&op=file
==============================================================================
--- wpa/trunk/debian/patches/wpasupplicant_band_selection_a1b790eb.patch (added)
+++ wpa/trunk/debian/patches/wpasupplicant_band_selection_a1b790eb.patch Mon Nov 23 00:35:04 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
+commit a1b790eb9d7514d1a6e0582a07f695a1564caa59
+Author: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+Date: Sat Feb 21 22:53:42 2015 +0200
+
+ Select AP based on estimated maximum throughput
+
+ This modifies the BSS selection routines to calculate SNR and estimated
+ throughput for each scan result and then use the estimated throughput as
+ a criteria for sorting the results. This extends the earlier design by
+ taking into account higher throughput rates if both the AP and local
+ device supports HT20, HT40, or VHT80. In addition, the maximum rate is
+ restricted based on SNR.
+
+ In practice, this gives significantly higher probability of selecting
+ HT/VHT APs when there are multiple BSSes in the same ESS and SNR is not
+ low enough to prevent higher MCS use.
+
+ Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
+
+--- a/src/drivers/driver.h
++++ b/src/drivers/driver.h
+@@ -202,6 +202,9 @@ struct hostapd_hw_modes {
+ * @tsf: Timestamp
+ * @age: Age of the information in milliseconds (i.e., how many milliseconds
+ * ago the last Beacon or Probe Response frame was received)
++ * @est_throughput: Estimated throughput in kbps (this is calculated during
++ * scan result processing if left zero by the driver wrapper)
++ * @snr: Signal-to-noise ratio in dB (calculated during scan result processing)
+ * @ie_len: length of the following IE field in octets
+ * @beacon_ie_len: length of the following Beacon IE field in octets
+ *
+@@ -225,6 +228,8 @@ struct wpa_scan_res {
+ int level;
+ u64 tsf;
+ unsigned int age;
++ unsigned int est_throughput;
++ int snr;
+ size_t ie_len;
+ size_t beacon_ie_len;
+ /*
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/scan.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/scan.c
+@@ -1554,8 +1554,8 @@ static int wpa_scan_result_compar(const
+ struct wpa_scan_res **_wb = (void *) b;
+ struct wpa_scan_res *wa = *_wa;
+ struct wpa_scan_res *wb = *_wb;
+- int wpa_a, wpa_b, maxrate_a, maxrate_b;
+- int snr_a, snr_b;
++ int wpa_a, wpa_b;
++ int snr_a, snr_b, snr_a_full, snr_b_full;
+
+ /* WPA/WPA2 support preferred */
+ wpa_a = wpa_scan_get_vendor_ie(wa, WPA_IE_VENDOR_TYPE) != NULL ||
+@@ -1577,22 +1577,22 @@ static int wpa_scan_result_compar(const
+ return -1;
+
+ if (wa->flags & wb->flags & WPA_SCAN_LEVEL_DBM) {
+- snr_a = MIN(wa->level - wa->noise, GREAT_SNR);
+- snr_b = MIN(wb->level - wb->noise, GREAT_SNR);
++ snr_a_full = wa->snr;
++ snr_a = MIN(wa->snr, GREAT_SNR);
++ snr_b_full = wb->snr;
++ snr_b = MIN(wa->snr, GREAT_SNR);
+ } else {
+ /* Level is not in dBm, so we can't calculate
+ * SNR. Just use raw level (units unknown). */
+- snr_a = wa->level;
+- snr_b = wb->level;
++ snr_a = snr_a_full = wa->level;
++ snr_b = snr_b_full = wb->level;
+ }
+
+ /* if SNR is close, decide by max rate or frequency band */
+ if ((snr_a && snr_b && abs(snr_b - snr_a) < 5) ||
+ (wa->qual && wb->qual && abs(wb->qual - wa->qual) < 10)) {
+- maxrate_a = wpa_scan_get_max_rate(wa);
+- maxrate_b = wpa_scan_get_max_rate(wb);
+- if (maxrate_a != maxrate_b)
+- return maxrate_b - maxrate_a;
++ if (wa->est_throughput != wb->est_throughput)
++ return wb->est_throughput - wa->est_throughput;
+ if (IS_5GHZ(wa->freq) ^ IS_5GHZ(wb->freq))
+ return IS_5GHZ(wa->freq) ? -1 : 1;
+ }
+@@ -1600,9 +1600,9 @@ static int wpa_scan_result_compar(const
+ /* all things being equal, use SNR; if SNRs are
+ * identical, use quality values since some drivers may only report
+ * that value and leave the signal level zero */
+- if (snr_b == snr_a)
++ if (snr_b_full == snr_a_full)
+ return wb->qual - wa->qual;
+- return snr_b - snr_a;
++ return snr_b_full - snr_a_full;
+ #undef MIN
+ }
+
+@@ -1669,20 +1669,21 @@ static void dump_scan_res(struct wpa_sca
+ struct wpa_scan_res *r = scan_res->res[i];
+ u8 *pos;
+ if (r->flags & WPA_SCAN_LEVEL_DBM) {
+- int snr = r->level - r->noise;
+ int noise_valid = !(r->flags & WPA_SCAN_NOISE_INVALID);
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_EXCESSIVE, MACSTR " freq=%d qual=%d "
+- "noise=%d%s level=%d snr=%d%s flags=0x%x age=%u",
++ "noise=%d%s level=%d snr=%d%s flags=0x%x age=%u est=%u",
+ MAC2STR(r->bssid), r->freq, r->qual,
+ r->noise, noise_valid ? "" : "~", r->level,
+- snr, snr >= GREAT_SNR ? "*" : "", r->flags,
+- r->age);
++ r->snr, r->snr >= GREAT_SNR ? "*" : "",
++ r->flags,
++ r->age, r->est_throughput);
+ } else {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_EXCESSIVE, MACSTR " freq=%d qual=%d "
+- "noise=%d level=%d flags=0x%x age=%u",
++ "noise=%d level=%d flags=0x%x age=%u est=%u",
+ MAC2STR(r->bssid), r->freq, r->qual,
+- r->noise, r->level, r->flags, r->age);
++ r->noise, r->level, r->flags, r->age,
++ r->est_throughput);
+ }
+ pos = (u8 *) (r + 1);
+ if (r->ie_len)
+@@ -1757,6 +1758,180 @@ static void filter_scan_res(struct wpa_s
+ #define DEFAULT_NOISE_FLOOR_2GHZ (-89)
+ #define DEFAULT_NOISE_FLOOR_5GHZ (-92)
+
++static void scan_snr(struct wpa_scan_res *res)
++{
++ if (res->flags & WPA_SCAN_NOISE_INVALID) {
++ res->noise = IS_5GHZ(res->freq) ?
++ DEFAULT_NOISE_FLOOR_5GHZ :
++ DEFAULT_NOISE_FLOOR_2GHZ;
++ }
++
++ if (res->flags & WPA_SCAN_LEVEL_DBM) {
++ res->snr = res->level - res->noise;
++ } else {
++ /* Level is not in dBm, so we can't calculate
++ * SNR. Just use raw level (units unknown). */
++ res->snr = res->level;
++ }
++}
++
++
++static unsigned int max_ht20_rate(int snr)
++{
++ if (snr < 6)
++ return 6500; /* HT20 MCS0 */
++ if (snr < 8)
++ return 13000; /* HT20 MCS1 */
++ if (snr < 13)
++ return 19500; /* HT20 MCS2 */
++ if (snr < 17)
++ return 26000; /* HT20 MCS3 */
++ if (snr < 20)
++ return 39000; /* HT20 MCS4 */
++ if (snr < 23)
++ return 52000; /* HT20 MCS5 */
++ if (snr < 24)
++ return 58500; /* HT20 MCS6 */
++ return 65000; /* HT20 MCS7 */
++}
++
++
++static unsigned int max_ht40_rate(int snr)
++{
++ if (snr < 3)
++ return 13500; /* HT40 MCS0 */
++ if (snr < 6)
++ return 27000; /* HT40 MCS1 */
++ if (snr < 10)
++ return 40500; /* HT40 MCS2 */
++ if (snr < 15)
++ return 54000; /* HT40 MCS3 */
++ if (snr < 17)
++ return 81000; /* HT40 MCS4 */
++ if (snr < 22)
++ return 108000; /* HT40 MCS5 */
++ if (snr < 22)
++ return 121500; /* HT40 MCS6 */
++ return 135000; /* HT40 MCS7 */
++}
++
++
++static unsigned int max_vht80_rate(int snr)
++{
++ if (snr < 1)
++ return 0;
++ if (snr < 2)
++ return 29300; /* VHT80 MCS0 */
++ if (snr < 5)
++ return 58500; /* VHT80 MCS1 */
++ if (snr < 9)
++ return 87800; /* VHT80 MCS2 */
++ if (snr < 11)
++ return 117000; /* VHT80 MCS3 */
++ if (snr < 15)
++ return 175500; /* VHT80 MCS4 */
++ if (snr < 16)
++ return 234000; /* VHT80 MCS5 */
++ if (snr < 18)
++ return 263300; /* VHT80 MCS6 */
++ if (snr < 20)
++ return 292500; /* VHT80 MCS7 */
++ if (snr < 22)
++ return 351000; /* VHT80 MCS8 */
++ return 390000; /* VHT80 MCS9 */
++}
++
++
++static void scan_est_throughput(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
++ struct wpa_scan_res *res)
++{
++ enum local_hw_capab capab = wpa_s->hw_capab;
++ int rate; /* max legacy rate in 500 kb/s units */
++ const u8 *ie;
++ unsigned int est, tmp;
++ int snr = res->snr;
++
++ if (res->est_throughput)
++ return;
++
++ /* Get maximum legacy rate */
++ rate = wpa_scan_get_max_rate(res);
++
++ /* Limit based on estimated SNR */
++ if (rate > 1 * 2 && snr < 1)
++ rate = 1 * 2;
++ else if (rate > 2 * 2 && snr < 4)
++ rate = 2 * 2;
++ else if (rate > 6 * 2 && snr < 5)
++ rate = 6 * 2;
++ else if (rate > 9 * 2 && snr < 6)
++ rate = 9 * 2;
++ else if (rate > 12 * 2 && snr < 7)
++ rate = 12 * 2;
++ else if (rate > 18 * 2 && snr < 10)
++ rate = 18 * 2;
++ else if (rate > 24 * 2 && snr < 11)
++ rate = 24 * 2;
++ else if (rate > 36 * 2 && snr < 15)
++ rate = 36 * 2;
++ else if (rate > 48 * 2 && snr < 19)
++ rate = 48 * 2;
++ else if (rate > 54 * 2 && snr < 21)
++ rate = 54 * 2;
++ est = rate * 500;
++
++ if (capab == CAPAB_HT || capab == CAPAB_HT40 || capab == CAPAB_VHT) {
++ ie = wpa_scan_get_ie(res, WLAN_EID_HT_CAP);
++ if (ie) {
++ tmp = max_ht20_rate(snr);
++ if (tmp > est)
++ est = tmp;
++ }
++ }
++
++ if (capab == CAPAB_HT40 || capab == CAPAB_VHT) {
++ ie = wpa_scan_get_ie(res, WLAN_EID_HT_OPERATION);
++ if (ie && ie[1] >= 2 &&
++ (ie[3] & HT_INFO_HT_PARAM_SECONDARY_CHNL_OFF_MASK)) {
++ tmp = max_ht40_rate(snr);
++ if (tmp > est)
++ est = tmp;
++ }
++ }
++
++ if (capab == CAPAB_VHT) {
++ /* Use +1 to assume VHT is always faster than HT */
++ ie = wpa_scan_get_ie(res, WLAN_EID_VHT_CAP);
++ if (ie) {
++ tmp = max_ht20_rate(snr) + 1;
++ if (tmp > est)
++ est = tmp;
++
++ ie = wpa_scan_get_ie(res, WLAN_EID_HT_OPERATION);
++ if (ie && ie[1] >= 2 &&
++ (ie[3] &
++ HT_INFO_HT_PARAM_SECONDARY_CHNL_OFF_MASK)) {
++ tmp = max_ht40_rate(snr) + 1;
++ if (tmp > est)
++ est = tmp;
++ }
++
++ ie = wpa_scan_get_ie(res, WLAN_EID_VHT_OPERATION);
++ if (ie && ie[1] >= 1 &&
++ (ie[2] & VHT_OPMODE_CHANNEL_WIDTH_MASK)) {
++ tmp = max_vht80_rate(snr) + 1;
++ if (tmp > est)
++ est = tmp;
++ }
++ }
++ }
++
++ /* TODO: channel utilization and AP load (e.g., from AP Beacon) */
++
++ res->est_throughput = est;
++}
++
++
+ /**
+ * wpa_supplicant_get_scan_results - Get scan results
+ * @wpa_s: Pointer to wpa_supplicant data
+@@ -1793,12 +1968,8 @@ wpa_supplicant_get_scan_results(struct w
+ for (i = 0; i < scan_res->num; i++) {
+ struct wpa_scan_res *scan_res_item = scan_res->res[i];
+
+- if (scan_res_item->flags & WPA_SCAN_NOISE_INVALID) {
+- scan_res_item->noise =
+- IS_5GHZ(scan_res_item->freq) ?
+- DEFAULT_NOISE_FLOOR_5GHZ :
+- DEFAULT_NOISE_FLOOR_2GHZ;
+- }
++ scan_snr(scan_res_item);
++ scan_est_throughput(wpa_s, scan_res_item);
+ }
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_WPS
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c
+@@ -3759,6 +3759,23 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_init_iface(str
+ wpa_s->hw.modes = wpa_drv_get_hw_feature_data(wpa_s,
+ &wpa_s->hw.num_modes,
+ &wpa_s->hw.flags);
++ if (wpa_s->hw.modes) {
++ u16 i;
++
++ for (i = 0; i < wpa_s->hw.num_modes; i++) {
++ if (wpa_s->hw.modes[i].vht_capab) {
++ wpa_s->hw_capab = CAPAB_VHT;
++ break;
++ }
++
++ if (wpa_s->hw.modes[i].ht_capab &
++ HT_CAP_INFO_SUPP_CHANNEL_WIDTH_SET)
++ wpa_s->hw_capab = CAPAB_HT40;
++ else if (wpa_s->hw.modes[i].ht_capab &&
++ wpa_s->hw_capab == CAPAB_NO_HT_VHT)
++ wpa_s->hw_capab = CAPAB_HT;
++ }
++ }
+
+ if (wpa_drv_get_capa(wpa_s, &capa) == 0) {
+ wpa_s->drv_capa_known = 1;
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant_i.h
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant_i.h
+@@ -825,6 +825,12 @@ struct wpa_supplicant {
+ u16 num_modes;
+ u16 flags;
+ } hw;
++ enum local_hw_capab {
++ CAPAB_NO_HT_VHT,
++ CAPAB_HT,
++ CAPAB_HT40,
++ CAPAB_VHT,
++ } hw_capab;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_MACSEC
+ struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
Added: wpa/trunk/debian/patches/wpasupplicant_band_selection_aa517ae2.patch
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-wpa/wpa/trunk/debian/patches/wpasupplicant_band_selection_aa517ae2.patch?rev=1957&op=file
==============================================================================
--- wpa/trunk/debian/patches/wpasupplicant_band_selection_aa517ae2.patch (added)
+++ wpa/trunk/debian/patches/wpasupplicant_band_selection_aa517ae2.patch Mon Nov 23 00:35:04 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+commit aa517ae22784aff08d3d9e38ad101b4b5c9828fb
+Author: Hahn, Maital <maitalm at ti.com>
+Date: Wed Jul 8 13:13:11 2015 +0000
+
+ wpa_supplicant: Fix a typo in wpa_scan_result_compar()
+
+ A typo in wpa_scan_result_compar() caused wrong scan results sorting
+ (and wrong roaming decision). This fixes a copy-paste regression
+ introduced by commit a1b790eb9d7514d1a6e0582a07f695a1564caa59 ('Select
+ AP based on estimated maximum throughput').
+
+ Signed-off-by: Maital Hahn <maitalm at ti.com>
+
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/scan.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/scan.c
+@@ -1580,7 +1580,7 @@ static int wpa_scan_result_compar(const
+ snr_a_full = wa->snr;
+ snr_a = MIN(wa->snr, GREAT_SNR);
+ snr_b_full = wb->snr;
+- snr_b = MIN(wa->snr, GREAT_SNR);
++ snr_b = MIN(wb->snr, GREAT_SNR);
+ } else {
+ /* Level is not in dBm, so we can't calculate
+ * SNR. Just use raw level (units unknown). */
Added: wpa/trunk/debian/patches/wpasupplicant_band_selection_f0d0a5d2.patch
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-wpa/wpa/trunk/debian/patches/wpasupplicant_band_selection_f0d0a5d2.patch?rev=1957&op=file
==============================================================================
--- wpa/trunk/debian/patches/wpasupplicant_band_selection_f0d0a5d2.patch (added)
+++ wpa/trunk/debian/patches/wpasupplicant_band_selection_f0d0a5d2.patch Mon Nov 23 00:35:04 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+commit f0d0a5d23bd406a60358add9fa101b49dc9f9039
+Author: Mukesh Agrawal <quiche at chromium.org>
+Date: Tue Apr 8 17:54:49 2014 -0700
+
+ Improve BSS selection with default noise floor values
+
+ When noise floor measurements are not available, compute SNR
+ using default values for the noise floor. This helps steer us
+ towards 5 GHz BSSes in high signal strength environments.
+
+ In more detail...
+
+ Existing code prefers a 5 GHz BSS when the 5 GHz BSS's signal
+ strength is "close" to that of the 2.4 GHz BSS, or when both SNRs
+ are large. However, the mwifiex driver does not provide noise
+ floor measurements, so we can't compute SNRs.
+
+ Because mwifiex doesn't provide NF measurements, the "large SNR"
+ code wasn't effective. By using default values for the noise floor,
+ we can again compute SNRs, and decide that the SNR is high enough
+ that we shouldn't worry about the exact difference in SNR.
+
+ The default noise floor values (one for 2.4 GHz, and one for 5 GHz)
+ were chosen by measurement in a noisy environment, so they should be
+ conservative.
+
+ Note that while this patch is motivated by mwifiex, it affects
+ ath9k as well. Although ath9k provides noise floor measurements
+ in general, it will sometimes fail to provide a measurement for
+ one or more specific channels.
+
+ As a result of this patch, we'll always compare BSSes based on SNR
+ (either measured or estimated), rather than sometimes comparing
+ based on signal strength. ("Always" assumes that the
+ WPA_SCAN_LEVEL_DBM flag is set. It is for mwifiex and ath9k.)
+
+ While there:
+ - fix a whitespace issue (spaces -> tab)
+ - clean up existing comments
+ - update dump_scan_res to indicate whether the noise floor is
+ measured, or default
+
+ Signed-hostap: mukesh agrawal <quiche at chromium.org>
+
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/scan.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/scan.c
+@@ -1543,11 +1543,12 @@ struct wpabuf * wpa_scan_get_vendor_ie_m
+ */
+ #define GREAT_SNR 30
+
++#define IS_5GHZ(n) (n > 4000)
++
+ /* Compare function for sorting scan results. Return >0 if @b is considered
+ * better. */
+ static int wpa_scan_result_compar(const void *a, const void *b)
+ {
+-#define IS_5GHZ(n) (n > 4000)
+ #define MIN(a,b) a < b ? a : b
+ struct wpa_scan_res **_wa = (void *) a;
+ struct wpa_scan_res **_wb = (void *) b;
+@@ -1575,18 +1576,18 @@ static int wpa_scan_result_compar(const
+ (wb->caps & IEEE80211_CAP_PRIVACY) == 0)
+ return -1;
+
+- if ((wa->flags & wb->flags & WPA_SCAN_LEVEL_DBM) &&
+- !((wa->flags | wb->flags) & WPA_SCAN_NOISE_INVALID)) {
++ if (wa->flags & wb->flags & WPA_SCAN_LEVEL_DBM) {
+ snr_a = MIN(wa->level - wa->noise, GREAT_SNR);
+ snr_b = MIN(wb->level - wb->noise, GREAT_SNR);
+ } else {
+- /* Not suitable information to calculate SNR, so use level */
++ /* Level is not in dBm, so we can't calculate
++ * SNR. Just use raw level (units unknown). */
+ snr_a = wa->level;
+ snr_b = wb->level;
+ }
+
+- /* best/max rate preferred if SNR close enough */
+- if ((snr_a && snr_b && abs(snr_b - snr_a) < 5) ||
++ /* if SNR is close, decide by max rate or frequency band */
++ if ((snr_a && snr_b && abs(snr_b - snr_a) < 5) ||
+ (wa->qual && wb->qual && abs(wb->qual - wa->qual) < 10)) {
+ maxrate_a = wpa_scan_get_max_rate(wa);
+ maxrate_b = wpa_scan_get_max_rate(wb);
+@@ -1596,8 +1597,6 @@ static int wpa_scan_result_compar(const
+ return IS_5GHZ(wa->freq) ? -1 : 1;
+ }
+
+- /* use freq for channel preference */
+-
+ /* all things being equal, use SNR; if SNRs are
+ * identical, use quality values since some drivers may only report
+ * that value and leave the signal level zero */
+@@ -1605,7 +1604,6 @@ static int wpa_scan_result_compar(const
+ return wb->qual - wa->qual;
+ return snr_b - snr_a;
+ #undef MIN
+-#undef IS_5GHZ
+ }
+
+
+@@ -1670,15 +1668,15 @@ static void dump_scan_res(struct wpa_sca
+ for (i = 0; i < scan_res->num; i++) {
+ struct wpa_scan_res *r = scan_res->res[i];
+ u8 *pos;
+- if ((r->flags & (WPA_SCAN_LEVEL_DBM | WPA_SCAN_NOISE_INVALID))
+- == WPA_SCAN_LEVEL_DBM) {
++ if (r->flags & WPA_SCAN_LEVEL_DBM) {
+ int snr = r->level - r->noise;
++ int noise_valid = !(r->flags & WPA_SCAN_NOISE_INVALID);
++
+ wpa_printf(MSG_EXCESSIVE, MACSTR " freq=%d qual=%d "
+- "noise=%d level=%d snr=%d%s flags=0x%x "
+- "age=%u",
++ "noise=%d%s level=%d snr=%d%s flags=0x%x age=%u",
+ MAC2STR(r->bssid), r->freq, r->qual,
+- r->noise, r->level, snr,
+- snr >= GREAT_SNR ? "*" : "", r->flags,
++ r->noise, noise_valid ? "" : "~", r->level,
++ snr, snr >= GREAT_SNR ? "*" : "", r->flags,
+ r->age);
+ } else {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_EXCESSIVE, MACSTR " freq=%d qual=%d "
+@@ -1751,6 +1749,14 @@ static void filter_scan_res(struct wpa_s
+ }
+
+
++/*
++ * Noise floor values to use when we have signal strength
++ * measurements, but no noise floor measurments. These values were
++ * measured in an office environment with many APs.
++ */
++#define DEFAULT_NOISE_FLOOR_2GHZ (-89)
++#define DEFAULT_NOISE_FLOOR_5GHZ (-92)
++
+ /**
+ * wpa_supplicant_get_scan_results - Get scan results
+ * @wpa_s: Pointer to wpa_supplicant data
+@@ -1784,6 +1790,17 @@ wpa_supplicant_get_scan_results(struct w
+ }
+ filter_scan_res(wpa_s, scan_res);
+
++ for (i = 0; i < scan_res->num; i++) {
++ struct wpa_scan_res *scan_res_item = scan_res->res[i];
++
++ if (scan_res_item->flags & WPA_SCAN_NOISE_INVALID) {
++ scan_res_item->noise =
++ IS_5GHZ(scan_res_item->freq) ?
++ DEFAULT_NOISE_FLOOR_5GHZ :
++ DEFAULT_NOISE_FLOOR_2GHZ;
++ }
++ }
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_WPS
+ if (wpas_wps_searching(wpa_s)) {
+ wpa_dbg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, "WPS: Order scan results with WPS "
Modified: wpa/trunk/debian/rules
URL: http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-wpa/wpa/trunk/debian/rules?rev=1957&op=diff
==============================================================================
--- wpa/trunk/debian/rules (original)
+++ wpa/trunk/debian/rules Mon Nov 23 00:35:04 2015
@@ -92,8 +92,6 @@
# install systemd support
install --mode=644 -D wpa_supplicant/systemd/wpa_supplicant.service \
debian/wpasupplicant/lib/systemd/system/wpa_supplicant.service
- install --mode=644 -D wpa_supplicant/systemd/wpa_supplicant at .service \
- debian/wpasupplicant/lib/systemd/system/wpa_supplicant at .service
# install D-Bus service activation files & configuration
install --mode=644 -D wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus-wpa_supplicant.conf \
debian/wpasupplicant/etc/dbus-1/system.d/wpa_supplicant.conf
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